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THE BOUNDARIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISDICTION IN EUROPE
DINAH SHELTON*
Over the past half-century, complex systems of norms, institu-
tions and procedures have regionalized many aspects of human rights
law in Europe.  The Contracting Parties to the European Convention
on Human Rights,1 for example, have repeatedly lengthened the list
of guaranteed rights and expanded individual access to the European
Court of Human Rights.  The result, as J.G. Merrills has noted, is that
“there is no aspect of national affairs which can be said to be without
implications for one or other of the rights protected by the Conven-
tion, [and consequently] there is no matter of domestic law and policy
which may not eventually reach the European Court.”2  Those issues
that might escape jurisdiction of the ECHR may still be scrutinized if
they fall within the jurisdiction of the European Union’s Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) or the mandate of the bodies and procedures established in
the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).
The strengthening and proliferation of European regional bodies
monitoring the human rights performance of their Member States
raise fundamental issues of governance.  While the need for regional
human rights protection is unquestioned in Europe, views diverge
about the appropriate division of jurisdiction and authority between
the Member States and regional bodies and among the different re-
gional institutions.  In particular, there is tension between the desire
to have regional bodies establish and enforce uniform human rights
standards and the need to respect Member States’ diversity.  Where
regional human rights norms do exist, a second and related problem
concerns limitations on those rights, and achieving the appropriate
balance between individual rights and the state general interest.  Who
Copyright © by Dinah Shelton
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1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention or ECHR].
2. J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2d. ed. 1993).
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decides, for example, between competing values such as privacy and
national security, or home life and environmental protection?  As the
membership in European institutions has expanded eastward, con-
cerns about maintaining a high standard of human rights protection
have increased the desire for uniform regional norms.
This article addresses these questions and concerns.  The first
part presents an overview of the three regional systems of Europe
concerned with human rights.  Part II examines the role of the two
regional courts, the ECHR and the ECJ, as supervisory bodies estab-
lished to ensure compliance with regional obligations.  It discusses the
courts’ methods of interpreting human rights obligations, including
the notion of subsidiarity and the doctrine of margin of appreciation.
Also considered are implied rights, evidence and fact-finding, the re-
medial powers of the courts, and the regional response to gross and
systematic violations.  Part III considers the problem of potential con-
flicts of jurisdiction among the various regional bodies.  The conclu-
sion evaluates the impact of the European human rights systems on
the laws and practices of the Member States.  It also considers the se-
rious issues that must be addressed in the near future to ensure the
continued functioning of the regional systems in the face of expanding
membership and growing caselaw.
I.  EUROPEAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Jurisdiction over human rights matters within Europe is con-
ferred on three entities of partially overlapping membership: the
Council of Europe, the European Union (EU) and the OSCE.  None
of them is concerned exclusively with human rights, but each one con-
siders the topic essential to achieving its objectives.
A. The Council of Europe
A little over 50 years ago, 10 northern and western European
countries3 created the Council of Europe, the first post-war European
regional organization.  Europe had been the theater of the greatest
atrocities of the Second World War and felt compelled to press for in-
ternational human rights guarantees as part of its reconstruction.
Faith in western European traditions of democracy, the rule of law
3. The original Member States of the Council of Europe and drafters of the European
Convention on Human Rights are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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and individual rights inspired belief that a regional system could be
successful in avoiding future conflict and in stemming post-war revo-
lutionary impulses backed by the Soviet Union.4  The Statute of the
Council provides that each Member State must “[a]ccept the princi-
ples of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its
jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”5
A year later, these same states, self-described as “like-minded
and hav[ing] a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, free-
dom and the rule of law,” agreed to take the “first steps for the collec-
tive enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Dec-
laration (of Human Rights)”6 and adopted the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter
European Convention).7  Today, membership in the Council is de
facto conditioned upon adherence to the European Convention and
cooperation with its supervisory machinery,8 a condition met by all of
the 44 Member States.9  In addition, accession requires free and fair
4. In the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, the contracting parties
declare that they are “reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which
are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by
an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance
of the human rights upon which they depend.”  For a discussion of the Convention’s history, see
J.G. Merrills, The Council of Europe (I): The European Convention on Human Rights, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221–23 (Rhija
Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 1997) (“Many statesmen of the immediate post-war epoch had
been in resistance movements or in prison during the Second World War and were acutely con-
scious of the need to prevent any recrudescence of dictatorship in Western Europe.”).  Merrills
also views the emergence of the East-West conflict as a stimulus to closer ties in Europe.  Id. at
222.
5. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3, E.T.S. No. 1, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 51
(Cmnd. 8969).
6. Pmbl, ECHR, supra note 1 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1948)).
7. Id.  On the origins and legislative history of the Convention, see A.H. ROBERTSON &
J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 1 (3rd ed. 1993); COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
COLLECTED EDITION OF THE ‘TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES’ OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (8 vols., 1975–85).
8. Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe,
Oct. 9, 1993, reprinted in D. HUBER, A DECADE WHICH MADE HISTORY: THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE 1989–1999 247 (1999).  See also Declaration on Compliance with Commitments Ac-
cepted by Member States of the Council of Europe, adopted by the Comm. of Ministers on Nov.
10, 1994, reprinted in Council of Europe, Information Sheet No. 35 (1995), app. I, 146.
9. Member States as of April 2002 are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzogovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechten-
stein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the “for-
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elections based upon national suffrage, freedom of expression, pro-
tection of national minorities and observance of the principles of in-
ternational law.10  Several new Member States also have entered into
additional and specific commitments during the examination of their
request for membership.11
The drafters of the European Convention focused their attention
primarily on developing control machinery to supervise implementa-
tion and to enforce the initially short list of guaranteed rights.  This
focus adhered to the mandate of the Congress that helped create the
Council of Europe: “We desire a Charter of Human Rights guaran-
teeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression as well as the right
to form a political opposition; We desire a Court of Justice with ade-
quate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter.”12  A Resolu-
tion adopted by the Congress stated its conviction
that in the interest of human values and human liberty, the (envis-
aged) Assembly should make proposals for the establishment of a
Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of
this Charter, and to this end any citizen of the associated countries
shall have redress before the Court, at any time and with the least
possible delay, of any violation of his rights as formulated in the
Charter.13
The European Convention drafters moved cautiously towards
fulfilling the aspirations of the Congress.  The original Convention set
forth a short list of civil and political rights and a single and opening
statement of the obligation of Contracting Parties: “The High Con-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.  Belarus and Yugo-
slavia are the only non-Member States in the region.  See About the Council of Europe, at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Communication_and_Research/contacts_with_the_public/About_
Council_of_Europe?COE_Map_&_Members (last visited Nov. 9, 2002); Chart of Signatures
and Ratifications, at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/En/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2002).
10. Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe,
supra note 8.
11. For a complete list of specific commitments entered into by Member States, see Com-
pliance with commitments entered into by member states: Undertakings entered into upon acces-
sion to the Council of Europe, COE doc. Monitor/Inf (99) 1, Feb. 18, 1999, and Addendum.  For
commentary, see J.F. Flauss, Les conditions d’admission des pays d’Europe centrale et orientale
au sein du Conseil de l’Europe, in 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (1994); Hans Winkler, Democracy and
Human Rights in Europe: A Survey of the Admission Practice of the Council of Europe, 47
AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT’L L. 147 (1995).
12. Message to Europeans, adopted by the Congress of Europe, May 8–10, 1948, quoted in
Council of Europe, Report of the Control System of the European Convention on Human
Rights 4 (H(92)14) (Dec. 1992).
13. Id.
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tracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”14  The
European Convention initially established two institutions whose
mandate was “to ensure the observance of the engagements under-
taken by the High Contracting Parties:”15 the European Commission
of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.  The
former Commission and Court were replaced on November 1, 1998,
with the entry into force of Protocol 1116 and the inauguration of a
new full-time Court.  The European Convention also confers some
supervisory functions relating to the enforcement of the rights it
guarantees on the Committee of Ministers,17 the governing body of
the Council of Europe.  Moreover, because the European Convention
is a treaty adopted within the framework and under the auspices of
the Council of Europe, some of its other organs and institutions also
play important roles in facilitating the application and implementa-
tion of the European Convention.18
The Court today is composed “of a number of members equal to
that of the High Contracting Parties” to the European Convention.19
The judges are elected for a six-year renewable period by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly20 of the Council of Europe from a list of three
nominees submitted by each Member State.  The judges serve in their
individual capacities and must be persons of “high moral character,”
14. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 1.
15. Id. art. 19.
16. Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994 (Nov. 1, 1998), E.T.S. 155, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 960
(1994).
17. Id. arts. 46(2) and 54.
18. See ECHR, supra note 1, arts. 15(3), 22(1), 30(1), 52 and 58.  See, e.g., Caroline Ravaud,
The Committee of Ministers, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 645 (R. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993); N. Bratza and M. O’Boyle, The Legacy of the
Commission to the New Court Under the Protocol No. 11, in THE BIRTH OF EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CARL AAGE NØRGAARD 388 (Michele de Salvia & Mark
E. Villiger eds., 1998); Andrew Drzemczewski, The European Human Rights Convention: Pro-
tocol No. 11—Entry into Force and First Year of Application, in 21 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (2000).
19. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 20.
20. The Parliamentary Assembly is one of the Council of Europe’s two main statutory or-
gans and represents the main political tendencies in its Member States.  The Assembly sees its
role as primary in extending European co-operation to all democratic states throughout Europe.
The Parliamentary Assembly’s members and substitutes are elected or appointed by national
parliaments of Council of Europe Member States from among their own parliamentarians.
Each country has between 2 and 18 representatives depending on the size of its population.  Na-
tional delegations to the Assembly are supposed to ensure a fair representation of the political
parties or groups in their parliaments.
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who “possess the qualifications required for appointment to high ju-
dicial office or be persons of recognized competence.”21  The judges
do not have to be nationals of the Member States of the Council of
Europe.  They serve full-time during their term and may not under-
take any activity incompatible with their judicial functions.  They
must retire at age 70.  The permanent Court has its seat in Strasbourg,
also the seat of the Council of Europe, and judges are expected to live
in the area.  The Court has a Registry and legal secretaries to assist it.
The Registrar is the chief clerk of the Court.
Although the European Convention initially created an inde-
pendent Commission and Court, the drafters made the Court’s juris-
diction optional.  They also established, but again made optional, the
world’s first individual petition procedure for human rights violations.
The “normal” procedure thus envisaged was one of inter-state com-
plaints brought through the Commission to the Committee of Minis-
ters.22  The Commission would meet in closed sessions, undertake
fact-finding, attempt a friendly settlement of the matter, and report its
findings to the Committee of Ministers for decision.23  Only the
Commission or the state could refer a matter to the Court, if the state
in question had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.  Enforcement of
judgments of the Court and decisions of the Committee of Ministers
lay with the Committee itself, which could suspend a state from its
rights of representation or ask it to withdraw from the Council for se-
rious violations of its obligations.
During the intervening half century, this rather modest system
has undergone evolutionary, sometimes revolutionary changes.  The
Council of Europe has adopted 13 protocols to the European Con-
vention, and in the process expanded the list of guaranteed civil and
political rights.  The first Protocol added a right to property, a right to
education and the undertaking by the Contracting Parties to hold free
and secret elections at reasonable intervals.24  Protocol No. 4 enlarged
21. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
22. The Commission acquired its competence to receive individual petitions in 1955, after
six states accepted the right of petition.  Many states took decades to accept the right of individ-
ual petition.  The U.K. filed its first declaration on 14 January 1966; France and Greece did not
accept the right of petition until 1981, while Turkey presented its acceptance only in 1987.
23. The original members of the Commission were mostly civil servants and members of
parliament; only three of the initial 13 members had legal experience.  The Court came into ex-
istence in 1959.
24. Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted March 20, 1951, (entered into force May 18, 1954), E.T.S. 9.
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the list further by prohibiting deprivation of liberty for failure to
comply with contractual obligations, by guaranteeing the right to lib-
erty of movement, and by barring forced exile of nationals and the
collective expulsion of aliens.25  Protocol No. 6 abolished the death
penalty except during wartime26 and Protocol No. 7 requires states to
accord aliens various due process safeguards before they may be ex-
pelled from a country where they reside.27  The instrument also pro-
vides for rights of appeal in criminal proceedings, compensation in
cases of miscarriage of justice, protection against double jeopardy,
and equality of rights and responsibilities between spouses.28  Protocol
No. 12 augments the non-discrimination guarantee in Convention
Art. 14 by providing that “the enjoyment of any right set forth by law
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground,” adding that
“no one shall be discriminated against by any public authority.”29
Protocol No. 13, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on February
21, 2002, abolishes the death penalty under all circumstances.30
Other protocols gradually enhanced the role and status of the in-
dividual before the Court and eliminated the discretion of Member
States to accept the jurisdiction of the Court and the right of individ-
ual petition.  In 1990, Protocol No. 9 enabled individuals to take cases
to the Court in certain circumstances.31  Protocol No. 11 fundamen-
tally restructured the system, eliminating the Commission and pro-
viding the new full-time Court with compulsory jurisdiction over in-
terstate and individual cases brought against Contracting Parties to
the Convention.32  Today the states are locked into a system of collec-
tive responsibility for the protection of human rights, a system in
25. Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, (entered into force May 2, 1968), E.T.S. 46.
26. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, April 28, 1983, (entered into force March 1, 1985), E.T.S. 114, reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 539 (1983).
27. Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, (entered into force Nov. 1, 1988), E.T.S. 117, reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 435 (1985).
28. Id.
29. Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, (not yet in force), E.T.S. 177.
30. The Protocol opened for signature on May 3, 2002.
31. Protocol No. 9 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, (entered into force Oct. 1, 1994), E.T.S. 140, reprinted in
30 I.L.M. 693 (1991).
32. Protocol 11, supra note 16.
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which the jurisdiction of the Court provides the centerpiece.  Pursu-
ant to Article 34 of the Convention, the Court now may receive appli-
cations from “any person, non-governmental organization or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation . . . of the rights set
forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.”33
The role of the Court has been complicated, however, by the
emergence of other Council of Europe instruments and institutions
concerned with human rights.  First, the European Social Charter
(ESC)34 with its protocols provides a system for the promotion and
protection of economic, social and cultural rights.35  The Charter was
opened for signature on October 18, 1961 and entered into force on
February 26, 1965.  It was amended by Protocol in 198836 and again in
1991.37  The 1991 Protocol modifying the supervisory mechanism of
the Charter is not yet in force, as it requires ratification by all parties
to the Charter.  Most of its provisions, however, have been imple-
mented through actions taken by the supervisory organs.
Two additional instruments have continued the evolution of the
ESC.  A further Protocol provides for a system of collective com-
plaints.38  Finally, in 1996, a Revised European Social Charter,39
bringing the earlier documents up to date and adding some new
rights, was opened for signature.  It will progressively replace the
original Charter and, as the consolidated text, is the basic instrument
for the future.
33. ECHR, supra note 1, art. 34.
34. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965), E.T.S. 35,
529 U.N.T.S. 89.
35. See, e.g., DAVID HARRIS, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1984); Anne Theodore
Briggs, Waking ‘Sleeping Beauty’: The Revised European Social Charter, 7 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 24
(2000); Klaus Fuchs, The European Social Charter: Its Role in Present–Day Europe and Its Re-
form, in KRZYSZTOF DRZEWICKI, CATARINA KRAUSE & ALLAN ROSAS, SOCIAL RIGHTS AS
HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 151 (1994).  See also Roger J. Goebel, Employee
Rights in the European Community: A Panorama from the 1974 Social Action Program to the
Social Charter of 1989, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 58 (1993).
36. The 1988 Protocol imposes legal obligations regarding additional economic and social
rights.  Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, May 5, 1988, (entered into force
Sept. 4, 1992), E.T.S. 128.
37. Protocol Amending the European Social Charter, adopted Oct. 21, 1991, (not yet in
force), E.T.S. 142.
38. Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collec-
tive Complaints, Nov. 9, 1995, (entered into force July 1, 1998), E.T.S. 158.
39. European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, (entered into force July 1, 1999),
E.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Revised Charter].
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The Revised Charter proclaims in Part I categories of “rights and
principles,” including workers’ rights and family and individual rights
to social security, health, and medical assistance.  Migrant workers,
women, children, the elderly, and disabled persons are afforded spe-
cial protections.  Part II of the Revised Charter defines the meaning
and elaborates on the general principles set out in Part I.  Part III of
the Revised Charter specifies the obligations of the States Parties,
giving each state a set of options.  First, each state undertakes “to
consider Part I of this Charter as a declaration of the aims which it
will pursue by all appropriate means.”40  Second, the state must accept
as binding at least six out of nine articles41 found in Part II.  Third,
each State Party has an obligation to select another specified number
of rights or sub-categories of rights with which it agrees to comply.42
This flexible system was drafted to induce the maximum adherence of
states while obliging all States Parties to guarantee some of the most
basic rights.
The Charter establishes a reporting system and a system of col-
lective complaints to monitor the compliance by states with their ob-
ligations.43  The reporting procedure calls for two types of reports.
The first is due every two years and must address the domestic im-
plementation of those Part II rights that the particular state has ac-
cepted.44  The second report, whose periodicity is determined by the
Committee of Ministers, addresses the status of Part II rights that the
particular State Party did not accept.
The initial review of state reports is by the European Committee
of Social Rights (ECSR), a group of nine experts “of the highest in-
tegrity and recognized competence in international social questions,”
elected by the Committee of Ministers.45  They assess whether the
40. Revised Charter, id. art. A(1)(a).
41. The nine provisions are Article 1 (right to work), Article 5 (right to organize), Article 6
(right to bargain collectively), Article 7 (the right of children and young persons to protection),
Article 12 (right to social security), Article 13 (right to social and medical assistance), Article 16
(right of the family to social, legal and economic protection), Article 19 (right of migrant work-
ers and their families to protection and assistance) and Article 20 (right to equal opportunities
and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the
grounds of sex).
42. See Revised Charter, supra note 39, art. A(1)(c).
43. Id. Part IV, arts. 22–24.
44. Id. art. 21.
45. European Social Charter, supra note 34, art. 25.  The Charter refers to a seven member
Committee of Experts, but the Council of Europe has given interim application to the changes
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states have respected their undertakings, and render legal opinions on
whether the national laws and practices of the States Parties are in
compliance with their obligations under the Charter.  The ECSE
transmits its conclusions to the Governmental Committee of the
Council of Europe, which is composed of state representatives.  The
Governmental Committee presents its findings on compliance to the
Committee of Ministers.  The Committee of Ministers may then make
the necessary recommendations to any of the High Contracting Par-
ties.
The most significant change to the ESC system comes with the
additional protocol providing for a system of collective complaints.
While opening the process to non-state actors, the mechanism differs
considerably from the judicial proceedings of the Court.  First, the
ESC procedure affords limited standing.  It allows complaints of “un-
satisfactory application of the Charter” to originate with one of sev-
eral types of groups: international organizations of employers and
trade unions participating in the work of the Governmental Commit-
tee; other international non–governmental organizations with consul-
tative status with the Council of Europe and appearing on a special
list drawn up by the Governmental Committee; and national organi-
zations of employers and trade unions from the Contracting Party
concerned.  Each state may also declare that it accepts the right of its
national non–governmental organizations to lodge complaints against
it.  Article 3 of the Protocol specifies that the “international non–gov-
ernmental organizations and the national non–governmental organi-
zations . . . may submit complaints . . . only in respect of those matters
regarding which they have been recognized as having particular com-
petence.”
The collective complaints are examined by the ECSR, which first
determines admissibility and then examines admissible complaints on
the basis of written submissions and possible hearings.  The Commit-
tee prepares a report on its examination of the complaint and the
conclusions reached.  The report is transmitted to the Committee of
Ministers, the complaining organization, and the States Parties.  On
the basis of the report, the Committee of Ministers adopts a resolu-
tion on the matter, which may contain recommendations to the State
concerned.  At the time the resolution is adopted, or four months af-
ter the Committee of Ministers receives the report, the Parliamentary
foreseen by the 1991 Protocol and expanded the number of experts, also changing the name of
the Committee.
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Assembly also receives the report and makes it public.  The State
must submit information on its measures to comply with the recom-
mendations made.46
In the first two years after the Protocol entered into force, ten
complaints were registered.  The first application, International
Commission of Jurists v. Portugal,47 complained of child labor in viola-
tion of Charter Article 7(1).  The ECSR transmitted the report con-
taining its decision on the merits to the Committee of Ministers which
agreed that a violation had been shown.48  The Committee then con-
sidered several consecutive complaints against France, Italy, Greece
and Portugal concerning the right of armed forces to organize and
collectively bargain.  These cases are noteworthy because of the po-
tential for conflicting jurisprudence between the ESCR and the
ECHR; Article 11(2) of the ECHR expressly permits Contracting
Parties to limit labor union rights for members of the armed forces.
A complaint subsequently filed in the case International Federation of
Human Rights Leagues v. Greece alleged forced labor.49  The ECSR
transmitted the report finding violations to the Committee of Minis-
ters on December 12, 2000; the latter made recommendations to the
Greek government.
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and its
Protocols50 supplements the ECHR by seeking to prevent the com-
mission of torture through an innovative procedure of visits and in-
46. Additional Protocol, supra note 38, art. 10.
47. Collective Complaint to the ECSR, Application No. 1/1998, available at http://hudoc.
esc.coe.int/search (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
48. Res. ChS (99) 4 (adopted by the Comm. of Ministers on Dec. 15, 1999 at the 692nd
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
49. Collective Complaint to the ECSR, Application No. 7/2000, available at http://hudoc.
esc.coe.int/search (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
50. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, (entered into force Feb. 1, 1989), E.T.S. 126, reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. 1152 (1988).  Protocol 1 widens the geographical scope of the Convention by ena-
bling states not members of the Council of Europe to accede to it by invitation.  Protocol No. 1
to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Nov. 4, 1993, (entered into force March 1, 2002), E.T.S. 151.  Protocol 2
makes technical changes to the arrangements for elections of the members of the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment.  Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 4, 1993, (entered into force March 1, 2001), E.T.S.
152.  The texts of the Protocols are reprinted in 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 339 (1994).  See Anto-
nio Cassese, A New Approach to Human Rights: the European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 128 (1989); Malcolm Evans & Rod Morgan, The European Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Torture: Operational Practice, 41 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 590 (1992).
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spections to detention facilities.  A Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT), composed of independent and impartial experts
whose number is equal to that of the States Parties, has the power to
visit places of detention of any kind, such as prisons, police cells, mili-
tary barracks, and mental hospitals, to examine the treatment of de-
tainees and, if appropriate, to make recommendations to the state
concerned with a view to strengthening the protection of the detain-
ees.51  A principle of “cooperation” has led the Committee to exercise
its functions in strict confidentiality.  Publicity occurs only if a state
requests publication of the Committee’s report, together with its
comments,52 or if a state fails to cooperate with the Committee or re-
fuses to make improvements following the Committee’s recommen-
dations.
The Committee carries out periodic visits to all Contracting Par-
ties and may organize such ad hoc visits “as appear to it to be re-
quired in the circumstances.” 53  The Committee is obliged to notify
the state concerned of its intention to carry out such a visit, but no
specific period of notice is required.  A visit may take place immedi-
ately after the notification in exceptional circumstances.  Government
objections to the time or place of a visit can be justified only on
grounds of national defense, public safety, serious disorder, the medi-
cal condition of a person or an urgent interrogation in progress relat-
ing to a serious crime.  In such cases the state must immediately take
steps to allow the Committee to visit as soon as possible.
The newer European Charter for Regional or Minority Lan-
guages,54 and the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities55 address problems of minority rights.  The
51. As of November 13, 2002, the CPT had made 95 periodic visits and 47 ad hoc visits.
52. Some 84 reports have been published in this way.  In addition, the Committee’s annual
report to the Committee of Ministers is made available as a public document.
53. See MALCOLM EVANS & ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE: A STUDY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1998).
54. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, (entered into
force March 1, 1998), E.T.S. 148.  Just 16 states have ratified the Convention as of March 26,
2002.
55. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, (en-
tered into force Feb. 1, 1998), E.T.S. 15, reprinted in 2 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 217 (1995).  The
Convention has been accepted by more than two-thirds of the Member States of the Council of
Europe, equally between western states and those of Central and Eastern Europe.  The first
four states to ratify have significant minority issues: Spain, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.
Yugoslavia, a non-Member State, is a party to the Convention.  In addition, Armenia and Bos-
SHELTON.DOC 03/20/03  2:22 PM
2003] BOUNDARIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISDICTION IN EUROPE 107
Framework Convention is so denominated because it is primarily a
statement of principles rather than a detailed set of obligations.  Su-
pervision of compliance is done through a system of state reporting to
the Committee of Ministers, assisted by an expert advisory commit-
tee.  The Council of Europe has also taken up human rights problems
posed by technological change, adopting the Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Individual with Regard to the Automatic Processing of
Personal Data,56 the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Biomedicine57 and its Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of
Cloning Human Beings.58
The Council of Europe also has developed extra-conventional
procedures in an effort to prevent human rights violations from oc-
curring.  The Committee of Ministers has authorized specific moni-
toring procedures59 while the Parliamentary Assembly has developed
others.  The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, for exam-
nia-Herzogovina both ratified the treaty before joining the Council of Europe.  The term
“framework,” widely used in environmental agreements, indicates that the Convention sets
forth general principles and objectives but does not specify the details of implementation by
States Parties.
56. European Convention for the Protection of the Individual With Regard to the Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, (entered into force Oct. 1, 1985), E.T.S. 108.
The Convention has been supplemented by the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Su-
pervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows, Nov. 8, 2001, (not yet in force), E.T.S. 181;
and the Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, (not yet in force).
57. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, (entered into force
Dec. 1, 1999), E.T.S. 164, is the first international treaty designed to preserve human rights in
the context of medical treatment and research.  The Convention insists that “the interests and
welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.”  Id. art. 2.
The Steering Committee on Bioethics (CDBI), or any other committee designated by the
Committee of Ministers or the Parties may request the European Court of Human Rights to
give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention.  See
Eibe Riedel, Global Responsibilities and Bioethics: Reflections on the Council of Europe’s
Bioethics Convention, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 179 (1997).
58. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition
of Cloning Human Beings, Jan. 12, 1998, (entered into force Mar. 1, 2001), E.T.S. 164.  The Pro-
tocol prohibits “any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to an-
other human being, whether living or dead.”  Id. art. 1.  It rules out any exception to this ban,
even in the case of a sterile couple and bars States Parties from derogating to the provisions of
the Protocol.  Id. art. 2.  A second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin was adopted
Jan. 24, 2002, E.T.S. 186.  It is not in force as of Nov. 4, 2002.
59. Andrew Drzemczewski, The Prevention of Human Rights Violations: Monitoring
Mechanisms of the Council of Europe, in THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
139 (Linos-Alexander Sicilianos ed., 2001).
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ple, has been attributed monitoring powers by paragraph 1 of the
1994 Committee of Ministers Declaration on Compliance with Com-
mitments60 and by the Declaration on the Protection of Journalists in
Situations of Conflict and Tension.61  The European Convention on
Human Rights itself gives the Secretary General power to request
Contracting Parties to furnish an explanation of the manner in which
their internal laws ensure the effective implementation of the provi-
sions of the Convention.62
The 1993 Declaration adopted by the Council of Europe Heads
of State and Government, meeting at the Vienna Summit, included a
commitment to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intol-
erance.63  The follow up involved creation of a new mechanism, the
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), es-
tablished to review Member States’ legislation, policies and other
measures to combat racism and intolerance and to propose further ac-
tion at local, national and European levels.  ECRI monitors the situa-
tion through an in-depth study of the situation in each of the Member
States followed by specific proposals designed to solve current prob-
lems or remedy deficiencies.  Draft texts are communicated to na-
tional liaison officers to allow national authorities to respond with ob-
servations.  After the confidential dialogue, ECRI adopts a final
report and submits it to the state concerned through the Committee
of Ministers.  State reports are made public two months after trans-
mission to the government unless the government expressly objects.
ECRI has completed a first round of reviews and aims to do 10 coun-
try reports annually during its second monitoring period.
60. See Declaration on Compliance with Commitments, supra note 8.
61. Declaration on the Protection of Journalists in Situations of Conflict and Tension,
Comm. of Ministers, May 3, 1996, at http://cm.coe.int/ta/decl/1996/96dec2.html (last visited Oct.
3, 2002).  Paragraph 7 of the Declaration provides that the Secretary General may speedily take
all appropriate action on receipt of reports of infringement of rights and freedoms of journalists
in Member States in situations of conflict and tension.  See also Recommendation of the Comm.
of Ministers, Eur. Consult. Ass., 98th Sess., Doc. No. R (96) 4 (1996).
62. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 52 (formerly art. 57,
amended by Protocol No. 11, supra note 16, art. 2).  The Secretary General has requested in-
formation from all states on five occasions (1964, 1970, 1975, 1983, and 1988).  On December 13,
1999, for the first time information was requested of a single state, the Russian Federation, con-
cerning the situation in Chechnya.  On the earlier requests, see Vojin Dimitrijevic, The Moni-
toring of Human Rights and the Prevention of Human Rights Violations through Reporting Pro-
cedures, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 1 (Arie Bloed et al. eds., 1993).
63. Appendix III, Vienna Summit Declaration, Oct. 9, 1993, at http://www.coe.fr/eng/std/
viennad.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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The Parliamentary Assembly has created a monitoring mecha-
nism to verify compliance with obligations and commitments of all
Council of Europe Member States.64  A monitoring committee is re-
sponsible for verifying the fulfillment of obligations assumed by
Member States under the terms of the Council of Europe Statute, the
European Convention and all other Council of European human
rights conventions, as well as the honoring of commitments entered
into by the States’ authorities upon accession to the Council of
Europe.  The procedure permits the Assembly to sanction persistent
non-compliance by adopting resolutions and recommendations, by
not approving the credentials of a national parliamentary delegation,
or ultimately by recommending action to the Committee of Ministers.
Finally, the Council of Europe created the post of Commissioner
for Human Rights on May 7, 1999.65  The Commissioner is elected by
the Parliamentary Assembly from a list of candidates drawn up by the
Committee of Ministers and serves a non-renewable six-year term.
The functions of the independent and impartial Commissioner are to
serve as “a non-judicial institution to promote education in, aware-
ness of and respect for human rights, as embodied in the human rights
instruments of the Council of Europe.”66  The functions are thus pri-
marily promotional and preventive; the Commissioner has no power
to accept communications.  In the exercise of his functions, the first
Commissioner undertook a fact-finding visit to the Russian Federa-
tion soon after taking office and submitted a report to the Committee
of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly on the situation in
Chechnya.67
In sum, the Council of Europe has moved from a system of hu-
man rights protection based solely on litigation to a complex network
of interlocking bodies focused on standard-setting, prevention, moni-
toring and enforcement.  It remains to be seen whether, in the long
term, the new procedures will alleviate the increasingly untenable
growth in the Court’s caseload.
64. EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. 1115 (Jan. 29, 1997).  The Resolution abrogated Order No. 508
(1995) on obligations and commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe.
65. Resolution of the Comm. of Ministers, Eur. Consult. Ass., 104th Sess., Res. (99) 50
(1999).
66. Id. art. 1.
67. Drzemczewski, supra note 59, at 154 n.33.
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B. The European Union
Outside the Council of Europe and following its creation, six of
its original States Parties68 moved to reduce economic barriers be-
tween them through establishing the European Communities.69  The
absence of human rights protections posed increasing problems as the
role and powers of the European Communities expanded and its leg-
islative and administrative activities had a growing impact on the
rights of individuals and companies.70  In an evolution parallel to that
of the Council of Europe, the Communities have subsequently en-
larged their membership71 and increased the power of their institu-
tions,72 eventually forming, first, the combined European Community
(EC) and then the European Union (EU),73 of which the European
Community is one of the Three Pillars.  The other two pillars are
68. The original members of the European Communities were Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
69. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) comprise the three
communities that are part of the European Union.  See Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (to expire in 2002); Treaty Establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167; Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, amended by the Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TEU or Maastricht Treaty],
and the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997)
[hereinafter the Treaty of Amsterdam].  A consolidated version of the various changes appears
as the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997).
70. The EC has legislative powers to adopt directives and regulations binding on its Mem-
ber States, with the aim of harmonizing or unifying laws and policies in the region on matters
within EC jurisdiction.
71. There are 15 Member States today: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.  Almost as many states have applied for membership: Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slo-
vakia, and Turkey.  The EU at a Glance, at http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2002).
72. The four basic institutions of the EC are the Council, the Commission, the Parliament
and the Court.  The Council is the primary policy-making body with one representative from
each state.  The Commission has 20 members, each of whom is responsible for one or more of
the 26 directorates that govern various activities of the EC.  Together they employ about 20,000
civil servants.  The Commission also has exclusive power to initiate legislative acts.  The Parlia-
ment, consisting of 626 members, is directly elected and participates in the legislative process
but does not have full law-making powers.  The Court consists of 15 judges, one from each
Member State.  See Institutions of the European Union, at http://europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
73. Treaty on European Union, Aug. 31, 1992, O.J. (C 224).
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common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters, set out in the Treaty of European Union
(TEU) Titles V and VI respectively.
Initially, the treaties creating the Communities contained few
human rights guarantees,74 being primarily concerned with economic
integration.  The ECJ first announced in Van Gend en Loos,75 and
then in Costa v. ENEL,76 the basic principle that EC law prevails over
Member States’ national laws.  The resulting doctrines of direct appli-
cability and direct effect ensured the supremacy of Community law,
but it appeared that no human rights system applied to Community
institutions in the exercise of their supranational powers.77  German
and Italian courts almost immediately raised concerns about the su-
premacy of EC law should it run afoul of constitutional protections
for human rights.78
To fill the human rights gap and ensure the continued supremacy
of EC law,79 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared in a series
of decisions that respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part
of the general principles of law which the Court is required to apply
in interpreting the Community treaties. 80  In Stauder v. City of Ulm,
the ECJ declared that a doctrine of fundamental human rights was
enshrined as a general principle of Community law and was protected
by the Court.81  In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,82 the ECJ an-
74. A few provisions contained specific guarantees.  See, e.g., EC Treaty, art. 6 [1992]
C.M.L.R. 591 (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality); Consolidated EC Treaty, art. 141,
O.J. (C 340/3) 242 (1997) (art. 119 of EC Treaty) (principle of equal opportunities and equal
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including equal pay for
equal work or work of equal value).
75. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963]
E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
76. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
77. Direct applicability derives from Article 249 (regulations are directly applicable in all
Member States) while the doctrine of direct effect generally provides that Community law that
is clear, precise, and unconditional, such that no further action is required by Community or na-
tional authorities, may be enforced by private parties before national institutions.  See T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 206–07, 215 (34th ed. 1994).
78. See Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of UIlm, Soczialamt, [1969] E.C.R. 419; Case
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 11 C.M.L.R. 225 (1972);
Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (1974).
79. The concern with human rights led some national courts to suggest that EC law incom-
patible with basic rights would not be implemented or given domestic effect.  See Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 78.
80. As early as 1970, the ECJ found human rights to be an integral part of Community law.
Id.
81. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 9 C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
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nounced a principle of autonomous human rights law, i.e., that the
validity of EC law would be judged by the EC’s own criteria for fun-
damental human rights.  In the Nold case,83 the Court of Justice held
that
[F]undamental rights form an integral part of the general principles
of law, the observance of which [the Court] ensures.  In safeguard-
ing these rights the Court is bound to draw inspiration from consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot
therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamen-
tal rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those
States.  Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human
rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which
they are signatories, can supply guidelines, which should be fol-
lowed within the framework of Community law.
Over time, both the basic legal instruments and the jurisprudence
of the Court have evolved to expand the rights of individuals, not just
in the economic field, but in regard to political rights as well.84  In as-
certaining the nature of these rights the Court looks to the European
Convention on Human Rights, including the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.  Thus, for Community acts to be consti-
tutional, they must be compatible with the requirements of the pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order.85
Further, to the greatest extent possible, Member States must apply
Community law in accordance with their human rights obligations.86
The ECJ has also held, in the seminal decision Francovich v. Italy,87
that Member States can be liable for breaching Community law if
they fail to implement directives.  This vindication of individual rights
ensures a remedy against Member States even when the direct source
of the violation is a private actor.88
82. International Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 78.
83. Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen undBaustoffsgroBhandlund v. Comm’n, [1974] E.C.R. 491,
507, 2 C.M.L.R. 183 (1978).
84. TEU art. 8b creates citizens’ rights to vote and stand as candidates in European elec-
tions throughout the Union.  Article 8d contains a right to petition the European Parliament.
Treaty on European Union, Aug. 31, 1992, O.J. (C 224).  EC documents on environmental pro-
tection stress rights of information, public participation and redress.  See ALEXANDER KISS &
DINAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1999).
85. Case 5/88, Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R. 2609, 2639, 60(1) C.M.L.R. 328.
86. Id.
87. Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, [1991] E.C.R. I–5357, 67(2) C.M.L.R. 328
(1993).
88. Compare Case 152/84, M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire
Area Health Authority (Teaching), [1986] E.C.R. 723 with Duke v. Reliance, [1988] 1 All
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This jurisprudence does not mean, however, that the ECJ can re-
view the compatibility of national laws or practices with the ECHR or
other human rights law outside the scope of Community law.89  Such
cases should remain within the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights.  Even after changes introduced by the TEU and
Treaty of Amsterdam, described below, the protection of human
rights generally is not listed as one of the express purposes of the EC
or one of the powers expressly conferred upon it, meaning national
laws as they affect human rights remain outside Community reach so
long as they do not impact Community law or policies.
Changes in EC law in favor of human rights have occurred, how-
ever.  The preamble to the Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the
European Community into the European Union, declared that “[t]he
Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention [of] . . . Human Rights . . . and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as gen-
eral principles of Community law.”90  The inclusion of this language,
derived from ECJ judgments, appears to constitute an express accep-
tance of the ECJ’s approach by the Member States of the Union.
The concern for human rights reflected in the Maastricht Treaty
preamble is reinforced in Article 2 of the revised Treaty of European
Union (Treaty of Amsterdam)91 which includes among the EU objec-
tives “to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the
nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizen-
ship of the Union” and “to maintain and develop the Union as an
area of freedom, security and justice . . . .”  Using language from the
former Preamble, Article 6(1) provides that the Union “is founded on
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,” while Article 6(2) re-
quires that the Union respects fundamental rights guaranteed by the
European Convention and the constitutional traditions common to
E.C.R. 626 (H.L. 1988).  In the first case the EC Equal Treatment Directive gave the applicant a
remedy against a public authority that failed to comply with EC law.  In the second case, the
applicant could not rely upon the directive in an action against a private company.  The Fran-
covich case fills this gap by allowing applicants to hold the state liable for failing to impose the
directive on private parties through transposition into domestic law.
89. See Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Austrian State, [1997] E.C.R. I-2629, 3 C.M.L.R. 1289
(1997); Case 12/96, Demirel, [1987] E.C.R. 3719, 3754, 1 C.M.L.R. 421, 439–40 (1989); Joined
Cases 60-61/84, Cinetheque, [1985] E.C.R. 2605, 2627, 1 C.M.L.R. 365, 386 (1986).
90. TEU, Preamble, para. F(2), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 253, 256 (1992).
91. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 69.
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the Member States as general principles of Community law.  Further,
Article 7 specifies a procedure that can result in suspension of mem-
bership rights if a “serious and persistent” breach of human rights oc-
curs in a Member State.92  The Treaty also strengthens the protection
against discrimination93 and makes human rights an objective of the
common foreign and security policy.94  Perhaps most importantly,
TEU Article 46(d) gives the ECJ jurisdiction over compliance with
Article 6(2), thereby making human rights broadly justiciable so long
as the issue presented in the case is linked to Community law.
In a process parallel to that developed by the Council of Europe,
the EU Member States have enunciated criteria that must be met by
states applying to join.  First, the “Copenhagen Guidelines” adopted
at the 1993 EC Summit, state:
The candidates must achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the pro-
tection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market econ-
omy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and
market forces within the union; and the ability to take on the obli-
gations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political,
economic and monetary union.95
Second, the Commission has deemed that the foundational principles
listed in the Treaty of Amsterdam Article 6 establish formal criteria
for membership.96
92. See generally HENRY SCHERMERS & DENIS. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 37 (5th ed. 1992); THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Nanette Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 1995); THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS (P. Alston
ed., 1999); Flaherty & Lally-Green, Fundamental Rights in the European Union, 36 DUQ. L.
REV. 249 (1998); Lenaerts, Respect for Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Principle of the
European Union, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2000).
93. See, e.g., arts. 2 (promotion of equality between men as women as a task of the Com-
munity), 3(2) (in all activities the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities and to promote
equality), 12 (prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality), 13 (Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Parliament, may take
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or be-
lief, disability, age or sexual orientation) and 141 (co-decision process to adopt measures to en-
sure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment for men and
women).
94. Art. 11, Treaty of Amsterdam (“The Union shall define and implement a common for-
eign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which
shall be . . . to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”).
95. E.U. Bull. No. 12, Supp. 5, at 39 (1997); see also Conclusions of the Presidency, E.C.
Bull. No. 6, pt. I.13 (1993).
96. Consolidated TEU, art. 6, O.J. (340/2) 153 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 13.
SHELTON.DOC 03/20/03  2:22 PM
2003] BOUNDARIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISDICTION IN EUROPE 115
Despite these advances, the precise obligations of organs of the
Communities remain unclear in the absence of an EU Bill of Rights.
Accession to the ECHR appears unlikely.  The Court of Justice has
determined in an advisory opinion, that the Community lacks compe-
tence to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights ab-
sent amendment of the Treaty.97  In the advisory opinion, the Court
noted that no provision of the Treaty establishing the European
Community confers on the Community institutions any general power
respecting human rights.  Nor can the Treaty’s “necessary and
proper” clause98 provide authority, because adherence to the Conven-
tion would entail such a substantial change in the Community human
rights system that the modifications produced by adherence “would
be of constitutional significance and would therefore be such as to go
beyond the scope of Article 235.”99  There is little likelihood of Treaty
amendment followed by accession, because EU Member States are
reluctant to turn over to the larger membership of the Council of
Europe the task of balancing individual rights with Community eco-
nomic and general interests.
The Treaty of Amsterdam nonetheless somewhat strengthens the
ECJ’s jurisdiction over human rights.  Article 46(d), as noted above,
confers jurisdiction on the Court to review the acts of the institutions
for conformity with Article 6, which requires that the Union respect
fundamental rights.  The Court is required to ensure that the law is
observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty.100  Arti-
cle 46 also expressly enables the Court to examine the compatibility
of “action of the institutions” with fundamental rights in regard to
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
For most subject areas, the Court’s jurisdiction rests on Article
220.  This provision allows the Court to examine the compatibility of
Member States’ legislation with the fundamental rights protected
within the Community legal order when such legislation implements
97. Accession by the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759.
98. Formerly Article 235, now Article 308, gives the Community broad implied powers.
99. Accession Opinion, supra note 97, at 1789.
100. Id.  The Court stated in its advisory opinion on accession that “it is well settled that
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the
Court ensures.”  See Gil. Carlos íRodriguez Iglesias, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in
the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L 169
(1995); Akos Toth, The European Union and Human Rights: The Way Forward, 34 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 492, 493 (1997) (arguing that opinion 2/94 undermines this well accepted thesis).
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Community rules or relies upon Community law to justify national
measures affecting the common market.  Several exceptions are pro-
vided to exclude matters from the Court’s jurisdiction, especially as
they relate to policing and internal security measures.101  These sub-
jects may be reviewable by the European Court of Human Rights, but
the Court has been deferential to the Community in most of its deci-
sions,102 finding that the European Community is itself a legal system
that secures fundamental rights and provides for control of their ob-
servance.103  Where such control is lacking because the ECJ lacks ju-
risdiction, the European Court of Human Rights may be more willing
to exercise its own jurisdiction to protect human rights.104
Although the Treaty of European Union was not amended in the
manner the Court suggested (to allow adhesion to the European
Convention), the EU decided in June 1999 to draft a European Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights to cover all rights that pertain to the Un-
ion’s citizens, in effect combining the guarantees of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, and
other human rights instruments.  The Charter was proclaimed at the
meeting of the Council of the European Union in Nice on December
18, 2000,105 but it was not adopted as a treaty, due to lack of agree-
ment among the Member States.  However, the European Parliament
has recommended that it be incorporated into the EU Treaty106 and
101. See, e.g., art. 35(5) TEU, excluding review of operations carried out by the police or
other law enforcement services or measures taken with regard to the maintenance of law and
order and safeguarding of internal security; and article 68(2), excluding jurisdiction over any
measure or decision relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of inter-
nal security in respect to matters concerning visas, asylum, immigration and similar policies.
102. See, e.g., M. & Co. v. Germany, 64 Eur. Ct. H.R. 138 (1990); Pafitis & Others v. Greece,
27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 566 (1999); but see Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 361 (1999).
103. M. & Co, supra note 102, at 138.
104. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, supra note 102 (holding the denial of voting rights in
Gibraltar for election of representatives to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights).
105. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. (C 361/1) (2000).  See
Rainer Arnold, A Fundamental Rights Charter for the European Union, 15/16 TUL. EUR. & CIV.
L.F. 43, 44 (2000–01).
106. The European Parliament supported a mandatory Charter incorporated in the Treaties,
in two resolutions.  See Resolution A5-0064/2000 of the European Parliament on the elabora-
tion of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: minutes of the plenary session
of March 16, 2000, and Resolution B5-767/2000 of the European Parliament on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights: minutes of the plenary session of Oct. 3, 2000.  The Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions also favor incorporation.  See Economic and So-
cial Committee Resolution 1005/2000 (Sept. 20, 2000), and Committee of the Regions Resolu-
tion 140/2000 (Sept. 20, 2000).
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the Commission has agreed.107  The Commission’s opinion is that the
Charter may be regarded at present, even by the ECJ, as an impor-
tant source of binding principles of fundamental rights.
The Charter is divided into six chapters.  Chapter I, entitled
“Dignity,” begins with a declaration that “human dignity is inviolable.
It must be respected and protected.”  The remainder of the first chap-
ter contains rights on the integrity of the person, the prohibition of
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, slavery
and forced labor.  These provisions are modeled directly on the
ECHR and must be interpreted in the light of the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, according to Charter Article
52(3).
Chapter II contains freedoms of expression, religion, privacy,
liberty and security, assembly, association, and the right to property,
including intellectual property.  Although the chapter is named
“Freedoms,” some of the rights it contains involve the state’s provi-
sion of services.  For example, it includes the right to education and
access to vocational and continuing education.  While most of the
rights are based on the ECHR, the freedom to choose an occupation
and to engage in work108 and the freedom to conduct a business109 are
derived more directly from Community law and the jurisprudence of
the ECJ.
Chapter III is devoted to issues of equality and non-
discrimination, including group rights to cultural, religious and lin-
guistic diversity.  Children, the elderly and persons with disabilities
are given particular protection.  Chapter IV is entitled “Solidarity”
and it includes many of the rights in the European Social Charter.
The right of collective bargaining and the right to strike are included,
as are protections against wrongful termination and unsafe working
conditions.  Protections are also afforded for the family, social secu-
rity and health care.  Chapter V follows with political rights, including
the right to vote and stand for election, freedom of movement, the
right of petition, and the right to diplomatic protection.  Good gov-
ernance or administration is also included in Chapter V and extends
the right of access to public documents to all citizens of the Union.
107. Communication from the Commission on the Legal Nature of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, COM(00) 644 final Oct. 11, 2000, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0644en01.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
108. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 105, ch. 2, art. 15.
109. Id. art. 16.
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Chapter VI concerns justice and includes the right to an effective
remedy and a fair trial.  The presumption of innocence and the right
to defense for those accused of criminal offenses follow, as well as
provisions on the proportionality of penalties and the principle of
nonne bis in idem (no repeated trials for the same offense).  The
Charter also includes objectives and principles, such as integrating a
high level of environmental protection and consumer protection into
policies of the Union, that are not stated as rights.110
In sum, human rights find protection in the EU today through
the revised TEU,111 the jurisprudence of the ECJ, and to some extent,
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  Other EC institutions also act in
regard to human rights.  The EC signs OSCE documents through its
president112 and EC employees sometimes participate in OSCE
meetings as delegation members.  In addition, the Parliament’s Hu-
man Rights Sub-Committee produces an annual report on human
rights in countries throughout the world.113
C. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The third institution that has taken on broad human rights func-
tions in Europe114 is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), formerly the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE).115  Emerging from efforts to lessen Cold War
hostilities, the Helsinki Final Act (HFA),116 which concluded the Con-
110. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 105, arts. 37–38.
111. The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC itself contained certain rights: the right not
to be discriminated against on the grounds of nationality (arts. 6, 40(5), 67(1), and 68(2)), equal
pay for equal work (art. 119), a freedom of movement (art. 48(1)).  The TEU adds the right to
vote and stand for election to the European Parliament (art. 8b) and rights of citizenship in the
Union (art. 8).  In addition, the TEU makes explicit reference to the European Convention on
Human Rights in art. K.2(1) and art. F(2).
112. Erika Schlager, The Procedural Framework of the CSCE: From the Helsinki Consulta-
tions to the Paris Charter, 1972-1990, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 221, 230 (1991).
113. See, e.g., European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy, Annual Report on Human Rights in The World in 2000 and
the European Union Human Rights Policy, EUR. PARL. DOC. (A5 – 0193/2001 final) 1 (2001).
114. Note that the United States and Canada are also participating states, making the OSCE
a transatlantic, rather than purely European institution.
115. The CSCE changed its name to OSCE in 1994 to reflect its growing institutional struc-
ture and procedures.  For a description of the evolution and changes, see OSCE HANDBOOK
12–16 (2000), available at http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/files/handbook.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
116. Final Act of the Helsinki Summit, Aug. 1, 1975, available at http://www.osce.org/docs/
english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
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ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, brought hu-
man rights into the context of regional peace and security.117  The
HFA consists of four chapters or “baskets.”118  Human rights issues
are addressed primarily in the Guiding Principles proclaimed in Bas-
ket I and to some extent in Basket III.  Of the 10 Guiding Principles
set out in the HFA, two deal with human rights.  In Principle VII, the
participating States undertake to “respect human rights and funda-
mental freedoms” and to “promote and encourage the effective exer-
cise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and
freedoms. . .”, respect freedom of religion, the rights of individuals
belonging to national minorities, and the “right of the individual to
know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.”  In the last
paragraph of Principle VII, the participating States agree to
act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.  They will also fulfill their obligations as set forth in the in-
ternational declarations and agreements in this field, including inter
alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they
may be bound.119
Principle VIII for its part devotes four paragraphs to the subject of
“equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”120
The various follow-up meetings to the Helsinki Conference
strengthened human rights protections, sometimes adding details not
found in other regional or global instruments.121  The follow-up con-
117. The CSCE opened at Helsinki in July 1973 and concluded two years later with the
adoption of the Helsinki Final Act.  The Final Act is not a treaty but sets forth political com-
mitments in the areas of security, cooperation and human rights.
118. Basket I, entitled “Questions Relating to Security in Europe,” consists of two sections
(“Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States,” and “Confidence–Building
Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament”).  Basket II deals with “Coopera-
tion in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment.”  The sub-
ject of Basket III is “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.”  Basket IV, the final
chapter of the instrument, spells out the so-called “follow-up” process.  See Harold S. Russell,
The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 242, 243 (1976).
119. Final Act of the Helsinki Summit, supra note 116.
120. The participating states recognize that “all peoples always have the right, in full free-
dom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without
external interference. . . .”  Id.  See generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND SELF–DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1990); THE
MODERN LAW OF SELF–DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); R. STEINHARDT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF–DETERMINATION (1994).
121. Follow-up conferences have been held in Madrid (1983), Vienna (1989), Copenhagen
(1990) and Budapest (1994).  The Madrid meeting focused on the issue of trade union freedoms
in light of the advent of the Solidarity movement in Poland.  Specific and detailed guarantees
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ferences have been used to review compliance with human rights
commitments and develop a mechanism for expanding the list of
guaranteed rights.  The meetings have also been used to focus public
attention on the failure of certain states to live up to their human
rights commitments.  In this context, various CSCE meetings have
made specific references to and commitments regarding national mi-
norities.
The Vienna Concluding Document established the Human Di-
mension Mechanism for dealing with the non-observance by states of
their human dimension commitments.  Subsequent OSCE confer-
ences have expanded the scope of the Mechanism in order to make it
more effective.  It is now a process of bilateral and multilateral nego-
tiations which obliges participating states to respond to requests for
information and allows states to bring situations and cases to the at-
tention of other participating states.  Thus, when one or more states
claim that another state is not living up to its OSCE commitments re-
garding the human dimension, a diplomatic exchange between the
states concerned follows, for which specific time-limits are provided.
If the matter is not resolved between them, a state may bring it to the
attention of all OSCE states and place the matter on the agenda of
OSCE follow-up or human dimension conferences.  In addition, the
Moscow Mechanism allows appointment of OSCE expert missions or
rapporteur missions to investigate questions or problems relating to
the human dimension.  The Mission may be invited by the state con-
cerned or initiated at the request of six or more participating states.
In emergency situations, a participating state may request a meeting
of the OSCE Senior Council, which may take action.  Finally, an early
warning mechanism allows either state involved in a dispute, a group
of eleven states not involved in the dispute, the High Commissioner
on National Minorities, or the Permanent Council to draw the atten-
tion of the Senior Council to any situation having the potential to de-
velop into a crisis. 122  In 1992, the CSCE established the office of the
regarding freedom of religion, non-discrimination, minority rights, freedom of movement, con-
ditions of detention and capital punishment were added at the Vienna meeting.  See CSCE,
Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting (1989).  Copenhagen also resulted in
considerable human rights standard-setting, especially concerning national minorities.  It was
also one of the first documents to refer to the right of conscientious objection to military service,
a right not contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.
122. See OSCE, HANDBOOK, supra note 115, at 49–50.
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High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)123 in order to
address potential conflicts posed by minority issues.  The mandate of
the HCNM is to provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early
action” where tensions involving national minority issues have not yet
developed but could develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, af-
fecting peace, stability or relations between participating states.  The
principal function of the HCNM is thus to address minority problems
before they degenerate into serious conflicts by mediating and pro-
viding advisory services to governments and national minorities.124
Still without a constituting treaty, the OSCE tends to focus on
human rights issues primarily through diplomatic intervention for
conflict-prevention and mediation.  The OSCE has also been engaged
in developing regional democracy, linking it with human rights.  An
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, established in
Warsaw, assists the democratization process in OSCE states and
monitors the implementation of OSCE commitments regarding the
human dimension.  Parallel to the OSCE efforts, the Council of
Europe created a program in 1990 to strengthen democracy and to fa-
cilitate the integration of new Member States into the Council of
Europe.125
The success of the HCNM led the OSCE in 1997 to establish the
post of Representative on Freedom of the Media (“Representative”)
in order to address “serious problems caused by, inter alia, obstruc-
tion of media activities and unfavourable working conditions for
123. See CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges of Change, ch. II, paras. 2–7, at 7
(July 10, 1992), http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/hels92e.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2002) (spelling out the mandate of the HCNM).  See also Arie Bloed, The CSCE and
the Protection of Minorities, in THE UN MINORITY RIGHTS DECLARATION 95 (Alan Phillips &
Allan Rosas eds., 1993); MAJORING IN MINORITIES: MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: MINORITY
RIGHTS IN THE ‘NEW’ EUROPE (Peter Cumper and Steven Wheatley eds.,  1999).
124. See Diana Chigas, Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice: The CSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities, 5 Helsinki Monitor, No. 3, at 27–28 (1994) (explaining the
context of the HCNM’s preventative mandate); see also Conrad J. Huber, Preventing Ethnic
Conflict in the New Europe: The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 1 CSCE
Bulletin, No. 3, at 17 (ODIHR, 1993); see generally W. ZELLNER, ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE OSCE MINORITY REGIME (1999).
125. See generally Andrew Drzemczewski, The Council of Europe’s Co-operation and As-
sistance Programmes with Central and Eastern European Countries in the Human Rights Field:
1990 to September 1993, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 229 (1993) (explaining the Council of Europe’s Co-
operation and Assistance Programs both generally and on a country specific basis).
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journalists.”126  The Representative acts as an advocate, observing
relevant media developments in OSCE participating states and pro-
moting compliance with OSCE principles and commitments regard-
ing freedom of expression and free media, including the use of hate
speech.127  The Representative also provides early warning on viola-
tions of freedom of expression, concentrating on rapid response to se-
rious non-compliance with OSCE principles and commitments by
participating states.  Where problems arise, the Representative seeks
direct contacts with the participating state and other parties involved,
assesses the facts and tries to resolve the issue.  The Representative
reports to the Permanent Council, recommending further action
where appropriate.
The OSCE has a comparative advantage in conflict prevention
because the Council of Europe is not a security organization and its
mandate is limited.  The OSCE has also taken action on some situa-
tions where the Council of Europe and the United Nations have been
inactive, such as with regard to citizenship and language laws in Esto-
nia and Latvia, and the language law in Slovakia.128  On the other
hand, the complaints procedure of the European Convention has no
parallel in the OSCE.  The political character of OSCE commitments
precludes judicial enforcement or complaints procedures, but allows
rapid response in periods of crisis.  It can thus be seen to supplement,
but not replace the pre-existing European system.  More generally,
the views and messages of various regional bodies may reinforce each
other, provided there is cooperation and coordination to avoid forum
shopping by governments and contradictory messages from European
institutions.  When the rights guaranteed by the various human rights
instruments differ in scope or breadth, European institutions could
adopt a principle calling for application of the “rule most favorable to
the individual” to ensure the widest protection for human rights and
avoid conflicts in jurisprudence.  However, where two or more rights
are invoked in a specific matter and either conflict or are in tension,
such as in the case of freedom of expression and the right to be free
126. PC.DEC/193, Mandate of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE
Perm. Council, 137th plen. mtg., 137 P.C.J. Agenda item 1 (Nov. 5, 1997), PC Journal No. 137,
Dec. No. 193, para. 2.
127. The European Court of Human Rights also has been concerned with hate speech in the
context of the right to freedom of expression.  See Jersild v. Denmark, discussed infra note 162
et seq.
128. For reports on these situations, see OSCE High Commissioner on Human Rights Re-
ports, available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/reports/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
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from incitement to racial discrimination or hate speech, the different
institutions may view the appropriate balance in different ways and
signal different obligations for states.  The proliferation of European
human rights bodies makes these potential conflicts more likely to
arise in practice in the future.
II.  JURISDICTION AND ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURTS
The litigation-based human rights system of the Council of
Europe is undoubtedly the best known aspect of its monitoring of the
human rights performance of Member States.  Similarly, the EU de-
veloped its human rights doctrine through the jurisprudence of the
ECJ.  In recent years, however, other procedures have emerged and
become important, including the inspection process of the European
Torture Convention, the conciliation work of ECRI, and the country
reports of the European Parliament.  To some extent, these new pro-
cedures reflect the borrowing of successes from other national and in-
ternational institutions.  They also reflect a shift of power as the Par-
liamentary Assembly and European Parliament increasingly demand
and play a role.  To some extent their expanding functions may also
respond to concerns about transparency and democratic participation
in regional organizations.
For the European Court of Human Rights, Protocol No. 11 fun-
damentally changed the system,129 abolishing the Commission and
giving individuals direct access to the Court to bring actions against
any State Party to the Convention.130  Protocol 11 also introduced a
129. Protocol No. 11 retains some elements of the prior system.  The conditions of admissi-
bility are unchanged, although with an entirely new court there may be differences of interpre-
tation.  Friendly settlement is still encouraged and can be seen as comparable to pre-trial set-
tlement conferences that exist in national legal systems.  More controversially, the judge of the
nationality of the defendant state will continue to sit as a member of a Chamber or Grand
Chamber, maintaining a sense of special pleading and deference to state interests.  While na-
tional judges have not generally sought to restrict application of human rights guarantees in fa-
vor of their state or had obvious influence on the outcome of cases, the presence of new judges
from countries with little or no tradition of an independent judiciary could pose problems for
the future.  However, with 37 languages used by applicants, the national judge may be the only
one capable of reading the file and having knowledge of local conditions.  On balance, as long as
the quality and integrity of individuals selected as judges remains high, the benefits of having
the national judge on a case probably outweigh the perception of partiality.
130. For a comprehensive account of the petition procedure, see generally LUKE J.
CLEMENTS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION
(2d ed. 1999).
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limited “appellate” procedure.131  A Grand Chamber of 17 judges now
has jurisdiction to review decisions of any seven member Chamber if
the case raises a “serious question affecting the interpretation or ap-
plication of the Convention or protocols thereto, or a serious issue of
general importance”132 and a panel of five judges of the Grand Cham-
ber decides that it is appropriate to do so after a request from one of
the parties.133  Although there is no explicit reference to intra-
Chamber conflicts in interpreting and applying the Convention, the
Grand Chamber could serve to ensure consistency of jurisprudence
by resolving any such conflicts.  The Grand Chamber conducts de
novo review of cases referred to it, including admissibility of the com-
plaint if the issue is raised.
The ECJ has also developed jurisprudence concerning its role
within the Union to ensure respect for human rights by Member
States and Community institutions.  The treaties themselves, while
containing references to human rights and provisions for the en-
forcement of obligations by Member States and Community institu-
tions, do not provide broad standing for individual actions.  Yet the
ECJ has developed and gradually expanded doctrines of direct effect
and state liability that allow individuals to rely on sufficiently precise
Community legislation in national courts notwithstanding non-
131. Technically, the case is not on appeal because the judgment of the Chamber is not final
until the period for referring the case to the Grand Chamber has expired.  ECHR, supra note 1,
art. 44.  A full right to appeal decisions was unacceptable to some states, while others insisted on
the importance of a larger number of judges deciding important cases.  The result in Protocol
No. 11 represents a compromise between the two positions.  For additional information on this
compromise and its effects, see Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery under the
European Convention on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 152–53 (1995).
132. Protocol No. 11, supra note 16, art. 43.
133. Note that the Grand Chamber cannot refer a case on its own motion.  A chamber also
may relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber prior to judgment, but only if none of
the parties to the case objects.  These innovations place more control over the litigation in the
hands of the parties.  According to Judge Bernhardt, this is not necessarily positive, as the par-
ties may be unaware of conflicts within the court regarding matters before it.  “The experience
of the present Court, acquired over some decades, indicates that relinquishment may be advis-
able before the chamber has taken a firm stand in cases where the matter is complex or the
opinions of the chamber’s members diverge.”  He adds that the new system “will seriously en-
danger the coherence of the case law of the future Court.”  Bernhardt, supra note 131, at 152–
53.  It is likely, however, that most losing parties will feel that the issue is one of importance and
should be referred to the Grand Chamber.  The other party cannot block a request for referral.
If the chamber has failed to follow prior case law in making its decision, the requesting party
should find five judges of the Grand Chamber willing to review the case.
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incorporation or implementation of the Community law.134  Most
cases will come on referral from national courts.
A. General Rules of Interpretation and the Specificity of Human
Rights Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the primary
source in international law for interpreting a treaty.  Although the
Vienna Convention was not in force when the ECHR was concluded,
the European Court of Human Rights, in Golder v. U.K., established
that the terms of the Vienna Convention concerning interpretation
are applicable to the ECHR because they enunciate “generally ac-
cepted principles of international law.”135  The Vienna Convention
adopts a modified textual approach, requiring that a treaty be inter-
preted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to [its] terms,” in its context and in light of its object and pur-
pose.136  The “context” includes the preamble and annexes, any
agreement between all of the parties, and any instrument made by
one or more of the parties, in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty.137  Subsequent agreements and practice must be taken into ac-
count, as well as any rule of international law relevant to the relations
among the States Parties.  Only when application of these primary
rules of interpretation leaves the meaning of a treaty ambiguous or
obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, may
recourse be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty.
A teleological emphasis on the object and purpose of a treaty
allows a dynamic or evolving interpretation that can move a treaty
away from the original intent of its drafters.  The ECHR and other
human rights instruments are usually drafted with considerable gen-
erality, however, making it difficult to determine original intent.  Ju-
dicial bodies thus exercise their authority by weighing the conflicting
134. See, e.g., Case 152/84, M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area
Health Auth., supra note 88 (Teaching), [1986] E.C.R. 723 (1986).
135. Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, para. 29 (1975); see also Luedicke,
Belkacem and Koç v. Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, para. 46. (1978).
136. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, art. 31(1), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
137. Id. art. 13(2).
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interests of the parties in the context of contemporary regional or
global concerns.138
The European Court of Human Rights describes the ECHR as a
“living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present
day conditions” rather than remain static.139  It also holds that the ob-
ject and purpose of the ECHR, which is to emphasize the protection
of human rights, requires that limitations or qualifications of the
rights granted be narrowly construed.140
The Court clearly struggles with questions of uniformity and di-
versity in judging whether a given state practice falls below ECHR
standards.  The Court has stated that it will search for “common
European standards” based upon domestic law and practice, other in-
ternational or European instruments and the Court’s own case law.141
The Court has engaged in such searches to determine the legality of
corporal punishment of juveniles,142 the distinctions between legiti-
mate and illegitimate children,143 criminalization of homosexual con-
duct,144 and the regulation of blasphemy.145  The Court will often defer
to the state when it finds no general consensus on an issue,146 but it has
also served notice that state law and practice cannot remain static
while European standards evolve towards greater human rights pro-
tection.  Thus, in the Selmouni case147 the Court announced that
certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and de-
grading treatment” as opposed to “torture” could be classified dif-
138. Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 58, 59 (1968).
139. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, para. 31 (1978); Loizidou v. Turkey
(Preliminary Objections), 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, para. 71 (1995).
140. Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214, para. 42 (1979–80); Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, para. 65 (1979); Wemhoff v. Germany, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55,
para. 8 (1968).
141. For an explanation of the principles and concepts informing this search and said bases,
see P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 74–80 (3rd ed. 1998).
142. Tyrer, supra note 139, para. 45.
143. Marckx v. Belgium, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, para. 41 (1979).
144. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, para. 60 (1981).
145. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, para. 57 (1996).
146. See, e.g., the issue of transsexuals, where the Court has found no “common European
approach to the problems created by the recognition in law of post-operative gender status.”
Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163, para. 1(e) (1998).  Where
the Court itself is divided, it may take this as evidence of a lack of European consensus, al-
though it has never discussed its methodology in determining whether or not a consensus exists.
147. Selmouni v. France, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403 (1999–2000).
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ferently in future.  [The Court] takes the view that the increasingly
high standard being required in the area of the protection of human
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably re-
quires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental
values of democratic societies.148
While it may appear from Selmouni that states are judged by
ever-changing standards, the Court in fact gives great weight to its
precedents.  Although neither the Convention nor the Rules of Court
expresses the principle of stare decisis, the Rules make abandonment
of precedent one of the grounds for a Chamber to relinquish jurisdic-
tion in favor of a Grand Chamber.149  The Court’s stated approach is
to follow its precedents “in the interests of legal certainty and the or-
derly development of the Convention case law.”150  It will depart from
an earlier decision if it finds the earlier interpretation erroneous or
for another “cogent reason” including the need to “ensure that the in-
terpretation of the Convention reflects societal change and remains in
line with present day conditions.”151
The European Court of Human Rights has made clear that the
principle of effectiveness is a fundamental principle of interpretation.
It requires that the provisions of the Convention be interpreted “so as
to make its safeguards practical and effective,”152 protecting the indi-
vidual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it
deals.153  The principle of effectiveness has led the Court to expand
protections in a number of areas.  For example, in Soering v. United
Kingdom154 and other cases concerning extradition or deportation, the
Court has admitted petitions when violations were imminently
threatened, but had not yet occurred.155
148. Id. para. 101.  In a subsequent decision in Bilgin v. Turkey (Nov. 16, 2000), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2002), the Court found that destruction of
property could amount to inhuman treatment in violation of article 3 of the Convention.
149. The Grand Chamber is the highest body under the Convention.  It consists of 17 judges
and three substitutes.  It includes the President, Vice-Presidents of the Court and Presidents of
the Chambers.  See Rules of Court, Eur. Ct. H.R., ch. V, R. 24, (in force Nov. 1, 1998), available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/RulesofCourt2002.htm#twentyfour (last visited Oct. 30,
2002).
150. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, para. 35 (1990).
151. Id.
152. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, para. 72 (1995);
Artico v. Italy, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, para. 33 (1980).
153. Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, para. 26 (1979).
154. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 349 (1989).
155. The decisions are particularly significant in light of the Convention limitation of stand-
ing to “victims” of violations.  ECHR, supra note 1, art. 34.
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The Court has been careful to note, however, that dynamic in-
terpretation cannot extend the catalogue of protected rights nor ex-
pand the territorial scope of state obligations.  In respect to the latter
issue, a state’s obligations may extend beyond the national territory in
limited circumstances, to areas over which the state exercises effective
control, whether acquired lawfully or not.156  But the Grand Chamber
of the Court unanimously held that such control requires “the exer-
cise of legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some
form of allegiance to that State or who have been brought within that
State’s control.”157  According to the Court, NATO aerial bombing
during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was not such a situation
because the acts were performed or had effects outside the territory
of the respondent states, not in areas where the states had de facto or
de jure control.  The result could be different for cases arising in terri-
tories like Kosovo, where control is exercised by a foreign military
presence.
Another noteworthy point in Bankovic, as in Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom,158 concerns the relationship between the ECHR and other
areas of international law.  In Bankovic, the Court indicated that it
must take account of relevant rules of international law when exam-
ining questions concerning its jurisdiction and must interpret the
Convention, insofar as possible, in harmony with other principles of
international law of which it forms a part.  The Court unanimously
found that jurisdiction in international law is primarily territorial, in-
deed, that other bases of jurisdiction must be considered “excep-
tional.”  This is a very narrow view of jurisdiction that does not ap-
pear consistent with most international law doctrine,159 but it is
understandable that the Court would seek to limit its jurisdiction to
exclude the extra-territorial military operations of its contracting
states.  In Al-Adsani the Court subordinated human rights jurisdiction
to rules of sovereign immunity despite the claim—accepted by the
Court—that torture constitutes a violation of a peremptory norm
156. Loizidou v. Turkey, supra note 152, para. 52.
157. Bankovic, Admisibility (Bankovic et al. v. Belg. at al), Stojanovic, Stoimenovski, Jok-
simovic & Sukovic v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
and the United Kingdom (Admissibility), Eur. Ct. H.R (2001), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
158. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11 (2002).
159. See generally D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 264–367
(5th ed. 1998) (discussing various bases for the exercise of jurisdiction).
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from which there is no derogation.160  These two judgments indicate
that the Court has been careful to see human rights as a branch of in-
ternational law, not as the trunk or roots from which all else grows.161
The European Court of Human Rights also references human
rights treaties and attempts to make its judgments compatible with
the texts of other human rights bodies.  In Jersild v. Denmark,162 the
European Court looked to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to ensure that its judgment would not bring Denmark
into conflict with its United Nations obligations to combat hate
speech.  Similarly, in Selmouni v. France163 the Court adopted the
definition of torture contained in the United Nations Convention
against Torture, while in Peers v. Greece,164 the Court made use of the
findings of the European Committee against Torture about prison
conditions in Greece.  This “cross-referencing” not only enhances the
weight of the decision by invoking multiple precedents, but helps
produce greater conformity of jurisprudence among the different hu-
man rights bodies.
B. Margin of Appreciation
The concept of a margin of appreciation is extremely important
to the work of the European Court of Human Rights.165  It determines
the scope of judicial review of state action and the degree of defer-
ence afforded to states in deciding on the implementation and appli-
cation of rights guaranteed in the European Convention.  To a large
extent, it reflects and encapsulates the principle of subsidiarity that is
much more prevalent in and associated with the EU and ECJ.166  The
160. Al-Adsani, supra note 158, paras. 57, 61.
161. See Dinah Shelton, The Hierarchy of Norms and Human Rights: Of Trumps and Win-
ners, 65 SASKATCHEWAN LAW REVIEW 301, 304–06 (2002) (describing assertions by human
rights bodies of the supremacy of human rights law over other domains of international law).
162. Jersild v. Denmark, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1994).
163. Selmouni, supra note 147, para. 97.
164. Peers v. Greece, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, para. 61 (2001).
165. See, e.g., R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1983); Thomas A.
O’Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the Court, 4
HUM. RTS. Q. 474 (1982); Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the
Court: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 57 (1990); HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW,
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
166. Herbert Petzold, The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in MACDONALD ET
AL., supra note 165, at 41.
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margin of appreciation acts both as a standard of review and as a sub-
stantive norm for interpreting the Convention.  While Article 1 of the
European Convention makes the obligation of States Parties clear to
secure the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention to every-
one, Article 19 provides that the Court shall ensure that this obliga-
tion is observed.
The doctrine of margin of appreciation was articulated in the first
case to come before the Court, Lawless v. Ireland,167 in connection
with the scope of judicial review of a declared state of emergency in
Ireland.  It was discussed in more detail in the Handyside case,168 in
reviewing a ban on publication in order to protect the morals of mi-
nors.  In the latter judgment, the Court refers to its role as subsidiary
to the national system safeguarding human rights because the Con-
vention leaves to each contracting state, in the first place, the task of
securing the rights and liberties it enshrines.  In particular, in assess-
ing restrictions and limitations on rights, the Court gives deference to
the state, because according to the Court, “by reason of their direct
and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international
judge to give an opinion on the . . . ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or
‘penalty’ . . . [I]t is for the national authorities to make the initial as-
sessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the no-
tion of ‘necessity’ in this context.”169  Consequently, a margin of ap-
preciation is given to the domestic legislator and to the local courts or
other bodies called upon to interpret and apply the law adopted.
The margin of appreciation is not unlimited, however.  The
Court, being responsible for ensuring the observance of state obliga-
tions, is empowered to give the final ruling on whether a restriction is
compatible with rights guaranteed by the Convention.  “The domestic
margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with European super-
vision.  Such supervision concerns both the aim of the measure chal-
lenged and its ‘necessity;’ it covers not only the basic legislation but
also the decision applying it, even one given by an independent
court.”170
167. Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1961).
168. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976).
169. Id. para. 48.
170. Id. para. 49.
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The doctrine has been applied to varying degrees in cases in-
volving the right to liberty (Article 5),171 the right to a fair trial (Arti-
cle 6),172 the right to respect for family and private life (Article 8),173
freedom of expression (Article 10),174 the prohibition on discrimina-
tion in respect to rights contained in the Convention (Article 14),175
and the right to property (Protocol 1, Art. 1),176 as well as the permis-
sibility of derogations from certain Convention rights (Article 15).177
In particular, the Court has used the doctrine in addressing those
rights in the Convention that are circumscribed by limitations clauses,
allowing the states to take proportional legal measures for prescribed
legitimate ends.178
The Court has often applied such clauses deferentially while pro-
claiming that limitations must be narrowly construed and placing the
burden of proof on the state to justify limiting measures.  In this way,
individual rights are adjudicated in reference to and balanced against
the general interest.  The breadth or narrowness of the margin varies
from one case to another, depending in part on the Court’s view of its
own competence to substitute its judgment for that of the state’s
authorities.  The Court thus scrutinizes asserted justifications for dis-
crimination more carefully179 while deferring considerably to a state’s
determination that specific measures are required by a national
emergency180 or that expression should be limited for reasons of mo-
rality.181
The freedom of expression cases decided by the European Court
suggest a complex evaluation of the need for some uniform standards,
particularly in reference to political speech, balanced with deference
to local authorities on issues of artistic and commercial expression.  In
171. Le Comte v. Belgium, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1981).
172. Golder v. United Kingdom, supra note 135.
173. Eriksson v. Sweden, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 183 (1989); Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 433 (1987); Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 203 (1986); Rees v. United Kingdom, 9
Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986).
174. Müller v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (1988); Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 103 (1986); Sunday Times, supra note 140; Marckx, supra note 143.
175. Engel and Others v. Netherlands, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 706 (1976).
176. Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 (1982); Lithgow v. United
Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 (1986).
177. Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 167.
178. See supra note 174.
179. Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471 (1985).
180. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 64–65 (ser. A) (1978).
181. Müller v. Switzerland, supra note 174.
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Jersild v. Denmark182 for example, an inflammatory interview with lo-
cal Ku Klux Klan members, who expressed their racist opinions and
negative views of minorities, was deemed to have sufficient public
merit to outweigh the insult to victims of the hate speech thus broad-
cast.  While the Court recognized the “vital importance of combating
racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations,”183 it also rec-
ognized the role of the press, which it called particularly important in
a democratic society in which one of the essential foundations is free-
dom of expression.  The Court said it is “incumbent” on the press to
impart information and ideas of public interest, “otherwise the press
would be unable to play its vital role of public watchdog.”184  This also
means that the choice of media and reporting techniques is neither
for the national nor the regional court, but for the journalists:
“[A]rticle 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and informa-
tion expressed but also the form in which they are conveyed.”185  In
particular, the Court endorsed the use of interviews, calling news re-
porting based on interviews
one of the most important means whereby the press is able to play
its vital role . . . .  The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the
dissemination of statements made by another person in an inter-
view would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to dis-
cussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged
unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.186
Thus, in the eyes of the Court, the racist remarks in question were not
enough to justify censorship.
While Jersild gave broad protection to journalists and political
speech, cases concerning commercial and artistic speech have nearly
always deferred to local sensibilities.  In Handyside v. U.K.,187 the
Court accepted the British government’s censorship of a book which
the government deemed obscene, anti-authoritarian, and destructive
of the morals of adolescents.  The Court, pointing out its subsidiarity
to national legal systems, found no uniform European conception of
morals, but rather variations according to time and place.  As such,
“[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital
182. Jersild, supra note 162.
183. Id. para. 30.
184. Id. para. 31 (citing Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153
(1992)).
185. Id. (citing Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 389 (1991)).
186. Id. para. 35.
187. Handyside, supra note 168.
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forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact
content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘re-
striction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them.”188  While the Court ul-
timately judges the necessity and proportionality of the measures, the
state authorities retain a margin of appreciation.
The Court’s application of its margin of appreciation doctrine in
this way has produced results that are inconsistent with its stated view
that information and ideas must be tolerated, even if they offend,
shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population, because
such are the demands of a democratic society.  The Court has upheld
bans on the exhibition of paintings deemed obscene by local Swiss
authorities189 and the showing of a film found offensive by the major-
ity-Catholic population of the Tyrol area of Austria.190  In Otto-
Preminger Institut v. Austria, the Court expressly agreed that the gov-
ernment could legitimately restrict speech to protect the majority’s
religious feelings and to prevent disorder when those offended
threatened to disrupt the cinema.  The speech of the minority may
thus be held hostage to the threats of the majority.  The Court sug-
gested that expressions about religion “gratuitously offensive” to ad-
herents of that religion constitute an infringement of their rights and
“do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering
progress in human affairs.”191  The Court considers it may be neces-
sary in a democratic society to “sanction or even prevent improper at-
tacks on objects of religious veneration.”192  States have a margin of
appreciation to determine the necessity of such interference with
speech.  Thus, the Austrian authorities were found to have acted “to
ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some people
should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwar-
ranted and offensive manner.”193  In Otto-Preminger the Court gave
little or no weight to the facts that the movie was shown in a small art
house attended largely by subscribers, advertising was designed to
discourage those who might be offended from viewing the film and
188. Id. para. 48.
189. Müller v. Switzerland, supra note 174.
190. Otto-Preminger –Inst. v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994).
191. Id. para. 49.
192. Id.
193. Id. para. 56.
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that seeing the film required paid admission from those who chose to
attend.
The Court’s use of inter-state comparisons to give content and
scope to Convention norms is sometimes in tension with the margin
of appreciation.  The Court often finds an emerging or established
consensus on evolved standards that it may apply to all states, not just
those that have moved in that direction.194  In other cases, where the
Court finds wide divergence in practice, it is likely to rely upon the
margin of appreciation to permit divergent political determinations,195
while calling on states to interpret and apply the Convention “in the
light of current circumstances,” having regard particularly to scientific
and societal developments.196
There are several problems with the Court’s approach.  First, it
risks moving to the lowest common denominator, halting the teleo-
logical approach that emphasizes the objective of protecting human
rights.  Second, from the perspective of the holdout states it is unclear
why a majority view should apply and override the margin of appre-
ciation.  Third, the approach itself seems to undermine the notion of
universality that is a foundation of human rights theory.  Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the Court does not specify its comparative
methods, standards of evidence or the scope of its inquiry.  Commen-
tators cite the lack of depth, rigor and transparency in the Court’s
comparative law approach to the margin of appreciation doctrine.197
In fact, the reference to national law usually appears simply as a
justification for the Court’s decision to give autonomous meaning to
the scope of a right or to decline to impose a common approach to a
new claim.  This approach can be understood within the framework of
the Court’s view of its role as subsidiary to the national legal systems,
but questions remain as to why a dissenting state should be held to
the majority’s views or, alternatively, why a lack of consensus should
194. See Marckx v. Belgium, supra note 143, para. 31 (concluding that evolution in Euro-
pean law no longer permits distinctions between illegitimate and legitimate children compatible
with article 8 of the Convention).
195. See generally Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); and Cossey v.
United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990) (lack of consensus on issue of transsexuality
means article 8 does not require changing of personal status to comport with new identity).
196. Rees, supra note 195, at 19; Cossey, supra note 195, at 17.
197. See Paolo G. Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human
Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1224, 1225 n.31 (1998); P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 603–09 (2d ed. 1995).
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permit states to escape a normative development justified on other
bases.  Given the expansion of the Council of Europe eastward where
states lack a firm political tradition of protection of human rights, the
Court’s approach could lead to a weakening of the human rights pro-
tections originally afforded under the Convention.
The challenge the Court faces is to develop a set of normative
principles that do not demand the express consent of the Member
States, while retaining enough political will to ensure compliance with
the Court’s decisions.  Judge MacDonald acknowledged this dilemma,
noting that “[a]s a supranational institution, the Court faces a genuine
difficulty over its proper role.  The whole enterprise of rights protec-
tion on this scale requires a delicate balance between national sover-
eignty and international obligation.”198  Grounding decisions in na-
tional law can be a means to retain and strengthen the Court’s
political legitimacy and protect it against charges of unduly overriding
state sovereignty.  Perhaps for this reason, the Court is most deferen-
tial when states claim the existence of national emergencies that may
affect the life of the nation.199  The Court affords the state a measure
of discretion in assessing the need for specific action to respond to the
emergency.  The Court must not forget, however, that it is usually
during national emergencies that rights are most severely limited, or
even extinguished.
European Union institutions rarely use the phrase margin of ap-
preciation but frequently refer to the fundamental principle of sub-
sidiarity that governs the relationship between EU institutions and
Member States.  The principle of subsidiarity is contained in Article
3b of the EC Treaty.  It provides that the exercise of Community
power is appropriate only where the objectives of the intended action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can there-
fore best be achieved by Community action.  It also means that an ac-
tion cannot go further than is necessary to attain Community objec-
tives and must be within the ambit of the EC treaty.  The extent to
which the doctrine of subsidiarity requires the ECJ to defer to na-
tional judicial determinations remains an unsettled issue.200
198. R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 124 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
199. Greece v. United Kingdom, 1958–59 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174 (Eur. Comm’n on
H.R.).
200. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2000).
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Like the European Court of Human Rights, the ECJ has faced
the issue of determining the proper balance between protecting indi-
vidual rights and respecting state limitations purported to be in the
public interest.  Under Articles 46 and 55 of the EC Treaty, Member
States may enact regulations that restrict freedoms on the grounds of
public policy, public security or public health.  The freedom or fun-
damental right to provide services, for example, can be limited by
rules which are necessitated by overriding reasons related to the pub-
lic interest.  Freedom of movement can be limited, even by discrimi-
natory provisions, if they are proportionate to the intended objec-
tive,201 which also must be in the public interest.202  The ECJ defers
somewhat to Member State “political and economic choices” con-
nected with “national or socio-cultural characteristics which are, in
the present state of Community law, a matter for the Member
States.”203  In many respects, the approach of the ECJ is similar to that
of the ECHR, without use of the term margin of appreciation.
C. Implied Rights
The European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ have looked
beyond the explicit language of their respective treaties to find rights
implied in the express guarantees.  The ECJ has implied certain hu-
man rights in order to ensure the successful attainment of the Com-
munity’s economic objectives, especially the free movement of work-
ers, goods and services.204  Other rights have emerged from the ECJ’s
doctrine of fundamental rights as a general principle of law, including
the right to property,205 the right to remedies for gender discrimina-
tion,206 and the right to privacy.207
201. See Case 352/85, Bond van Adverterrders v. Netherlands, [1988] E.C.R. 2085, 2135, 3
C.M.L.R. 113 (1988).  Proportionality analysis in the ECJ is very similar to that of the ECHR.
The measure in question must serve a legitimate end; there must be no equally effective, less
burdensome measure available and the negative impact on the freedom must not be excessive
compared to the gain.  Id.
202. See Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis,
[1991] E.C.R. I-2925, I-2960 (1991).
203. See Case 159/90, Soc. for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ireland, Ltd. v. Grogan, [1991]
E.C.R. I-4685, I-4717, 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991) [hereinafter SPUC].
204. While Article 60 of the EC treaty expressly mentions the right to move freely within
the Community to provide services, the Court has had to imply a right to travel to receive serv-
ices.  See Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi v. Ministero del Tesoro, [1984] E.C.R. 377.
205. See Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, 3745.
206. See Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Soc. Anon. Belge de Nav’n Aerienne Sabena, [1978]
E.C.R. 1365, 1378.
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The ECHR has implied rights as part of its “doctrine of effec-
tiveness.”  In the Golder case,208 the applicant was denied permission
to see a lawyer in order to bring an action against a prison warden.
The European Court of Human Rights found that the government
violated Article 6, the right to a fair trial, because that right must be
held to imply a right of access to a court where a fair trial could be ob-
tained.  The ECHR found this interpretation based on “the very
terms of the first sentence of Article 6(1), read in its context and
having regard to the object and purpose of the convention, a law-
making treaty . . . and to general principles of law.”209  Similarly, the
ECHR held in Airey v. Ireland,210 that where no legal aid was avail-
able and the costs of litigation were prohibitive, the government vio-
lated the right of access to a court as part of the right of a fair trial.  In
Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç211 the ECHR found an obligation to
provide free interpretation for foreign-language defendants in crimi-
nal cases implied in the right to a fair trial.
The European Court of Human Rights also implied positive ob-
ligations with respect to certain rights, including the right to life212 and
the right to family life.213  The right to freedom of assembly may also
require positive measures to ensure that others do not interfere with
the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly.214  The European
Court of Human Rights has accepted that pollution and other envi-
ronmental harm can lead to violations of rights guaranteed by the
Convention, particularly Article 8 which provides for respect for
home and private life.215
D. Fact-finding, Evidence and Burden of Proof
In the former system, the Commission had primary authority to
determine the facts of cases brought before it.  The Commission un-
dertook its examination of the application “with a view to ascertain-
207. See Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst A.G. v. Comm’n, [1989] E.C.R. 2859, 2924.
208. Golder, supra note 135.
209. Id. para. 40.
210. Airey, supra note 153.
211. Luedicke, supra note 135.
212. McCann v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 324 (ser. A) (1995).
213. Marckx v. Belgium, supra note 143, para. 49; Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 12 Eur. H.R.
Rep 36, para. 49 (1989).
214. Plattform Arrtzte fur das Legen v. Austria, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 204, para. 32 (1988).
215. Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994); Maria Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 357 (1998).
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ing the facts.”  Determination of whether or not the facts found dis-
closed a violation of the Convention was a matter for the Committee
of Ministers, unless the respondent state or the Commission referred
the case to the European Court of Human Rights.  In practice, hear-
ings were held with representatives of the parties.  The Commission
also had authority to undertake an investigation, for which the state
or states involved were to “furnish all necessary facilities, after an ex-
change of views with the Commission.”  The exchange of views was
only as to time, place, and manner of the investigation, not as to the
Commission’s determination that an investigation was needed.  That
question lay totally within the Commission’s discretion.  Today, the
ECHR increasingly must evaluate evidence as cases, particularly
against Turkey, arrive on disputed facts.  The European Court of
Human Rights may conduct hearings on site or seek documentary
evidence.  In most cases, the Court has stated that the applicant must
prove allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.216  This standard is
proving insurmountable in cases where the government allegedly en-
gages in forms of mistreatment that leave few physical signs.  While
the Court shifts the burden to the government to explain custodial
injuries where clear medical evidence is present, this does not help in
cases where more subtle, if equally serious, forms of mistreatment oc-
cur.  Thus, in Sevtap Veznedaroglu v. Turkey,217 where the applicant
asserted that she had been held in detention without charges, and
subjected to death threats, electric shocks, and hanging by the arms,
and deprived of food, the lack of forensic evidence precluded a find-
ing in her favor.  A compelling dissent in the case argues that the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is legally untenable in
torture cases and, in practice, unachievable:
Independent observers are not, to my knowledge, usually invited to
witness the rack, nor is a transcript of proceedings in triplicate
handed over at the end of each session of torture; its victims cower
alone in oppressive and painful solitude, while the team of interro-
gators has almost unlimited means at its disposal to deny the hap-
pening of, or their participation in, the gruesome pageant.  The soli-
tary victim’s complaint is almost invariably confronted with the
negation ‘corroborated’ by many.218
216. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 180, para. 161.
217. Sevtap Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), available at http://www.echr.coe.
int/Eng /Judgments.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
218. Id. para. 14.
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As the dissent notes, the forced nudity, suspension, death and
rape threats, and deprivation of food are “amusements particularly
ungenerous with those tangible signs dear to forensic experts.”  Ac-
cording to the dissent, the only reasonable test ought to have been:
“on a balance of credibility, which of the two parties rests more con-
vincingly on the side of truth?”219
The ECJ requires both the applicant and the defendant to ad-
duce the evidence upon which they rely to prove an assertion of
fact.220  In addition, the ECJ has the power to call for the production
of evidence.  The risk of non-persuasion rests with the applicant,
however, unless the evidence is in the hands of a party who fails to
produce it.221  Unlike the ECHR, the ECJ has not insisted on a spe-
cific standard of proof.  The ECJ has referred to “full proof”;222 to
“sufficiently weighty, clear and uncontradictory circumstantial evi-
dence that is not contradicted by contrary circumstantial evidence”;223
and to a “reasonable degree of certainty.”224
The jurisprudence of the two courts and that of other human
rights tribunals225 suggests their understanding that human rights liti-
gation differs somewhat from a typical inter-state dispute brought to
219. Id. para. 16.
220. See, e.g., Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77, Ruckdeschel v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St.
Annen, [1977] E.C.R. 1753, 1784, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 8457, at 8246.  In Case 18/70,
Duraffour v. Council, [1971] E.C.R. 515, the court held that the applicant had the burden of
proof that her husband had not committed suicide, in order to justice a widow’s insurance claim;
however, the defendant also was bound, “as the appointing authority, to cooperate . . . in order
to discover the truth.”  Id. at 525, ¶ 31.
221. See, e.g., Case 45/64, Comm’n v. Italy, [1965] E.C.R. 857, 867, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 8038, at 7542 (ECJ shifted burden onto defendant government after commission chal-
lenged certain Italian taxing procedures as violation of article 96 of EEC Treaty).  The govern-
ment asserted that the burden was on the commission to prove that the tax refunds it was mak-
ing were greater than those authorized by the Treaty.  Id. at 874, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶
8038, at 7548 (opinion of Advocate-General Gand).  The information necessary to decide this
issue was in the possession of the Italian government, however.  Id.  The court held that the
government must provide the evidence to prove compliance.  See also Case 19/77, Miller v.
Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 131, 152–53, ¶¶ 20–22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 8439, at 7926
(dismissing application where applicant failed to produce accounts to support its claim that fine
imposed by commission was unduly burdensome).
222. Case 6/54, Netherlands v. High Auth., [1954–56] E.C.R. 103, 115.  Case 6/54, Nether-
lands High Authority, [1954–56] E.C.R. 103, 115.
223. Case 18/70, Duraffour v. Council, [1971] E.C.R. 515, 525, ¶ 30.
224. Case 8/65, Acciaierie e Ferriere Pugliesi v. High Auth., [1966] E.C.R. 1, 12.
225. See generally Dinah Shelton, Judicial Review of State Action by International Courts, 12
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 361 (1989) (describing the proceedings and evidence rules before interna-
tional human rights tribunals).
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an international tribunal, where the parties are not only juridically
equal, but are often similarly situated to obtain and produce evidence
“to enable the tribunal to discover the truth concerning the conflict-
ing claims of the parties before it.”226  In human rights litigation, the
primary purpose is to ensure that states comply with their obligations
to respect and ensure the internationally guaranteed rights.  The de-
fendant state has exclusive control over the territory where the evi-
dence is to be found and over the individuals bringing the claims.  The
parties are neither legally nor factually equal in their ability to pro-
duce evidence.  In this circumstance, the courts draw upon the civil
law model of inquiry or investigation and may shift the burden to the
state to produce evidence when facts are disputed.  They may also
more readily apply a presumption of truth from a state’s silence or
failure to cooperate.
E. Remedial Powers and Enforcement
Article 41 of the European Convention is cryptic and does not
make clear whether the Court may order remedial measures when a
violation is found.  Throughout most of its history, the ECHR has in-
terpreted its powers narrowly and declared that it is for the respon-
dent state to decide upon the measures needed to fulfill the state’s
obligations and comply with the judgment declaring the state’s law or
action incompatible with the Convention.  Judgments always involve
a declaration judging whether or not a violation has been proven.
Where a violation is found, Article 41 allows the ECHR to give “just
satisfaction” to the injured party, including pecuniary and moral
damages, as well as reimbursement of costs, expenses, and attorneys’
fees.  The ECHR’s judgments on remedies have been inconsistent
and are rarely accompanied by reasoned opinions.227
The judgments of the ECHR are legally binding on the respon-
dent state.  The Committee of Ministers, a political body, has the re-
226. D. V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 1 (1975).  In this
context, it is important to distinguish between establishment of the facts and weighing the infer-
ences and conclusions to be drawn from them.  The latter is an inherent part of the judicial func-
tion.  In situations where the parties agree on the facts, courts normally do not reopen factual
issues.  At least one court rejected being bound by concessions made by the parties, however,
viewing the nature of the proceedings before it as neither wholly accusatorial nor entirely in-
quisitorial.  See Andre, Evidence Before the European Court of Justice, with Special Reference to
the Grundig/Consten Decision, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 35, 38 (1967–68).
227. For a critical evaluation of the Court’s approach, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 47–60, 217–18, 272–78 (1999).
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sponsibility to ensure compliance with the ECHR’s decisions.  Article
8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe empowers the Committee of
Ministers to suspend or expel from membership any State that has se-
riously violated Article 3 of the Statute.  Systematic human rights
violations or non-compliance with judgments of the Court would
likely be seen as such a breach.228
The ECJ indicated its approach to remedies for breach of Com-
munity law in Brasserie du Pecheur v. Germany.229  The ECJ applied
the principle that the state is liable for damage caused in accordance
with its national law, stating that:
Reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of
breaches of Community law must be commensurate with the loss or
damage sustained so as to ensure the effective protection for their
rights.  In the absence of relevant Community provisions, it is for
the domestic legal system of each Member State to set the criteria
for determining the extent of reparation.  However, those criteria
must not be less favorable than those applying to similar claims
based on domestic law and must not be such as in practice to make
it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation.230
Applying this test, the ECJ found that the limitations of German na-
tional law were incompatible with Community law.231  In other cases,
the ECJ also has exercised supervisory power over the remedies pro-
vided by Member States, using the principle of subsidiarity in favor of
its jurisdiction.  In several cases, for example, the Court has held that
the prohibition of discrimination must be enforced by sanctions that
have a real deterring effect.232
228. See, e.g., LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1959-90 (1973) (discussing Greece’s withdrawal on the eve of its expulsion
from the Council in the 1970s).
229. Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany, [1996] E.C.R.
I-1029.
230. Id. paras. 82–83.
231. Germany had been found in violation of EC law.  Those injured by the violation then
sought reparations.  The German court referred the question of whether national law or Com-
munity law governed the conditions under which reparations would be afforded to the ECJ.
The German law made government liability for reparations dependant “on a legislative act or
omission being referable to an individual situation.”  Id. para. 71.  The ECJ, however, said that
this would make effective reparation for loss or damage from breach of Community law impos-
sible or extremely difficult in practice, and hence it could not apply to legislative breaches of EC
law.  Id. para. 72.
232. See, e.g., Case C-177/88, Dekker, [1990] E.C.R. I-3941 and Case C-271/91, Marshall v.
Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Auth., [1993] E.C.R. I-4400, 3 C.M.L.R.
293 (1993).  For a discussion of ECJ cases on remedies, see SHELTON, supra note 225, at 161–66.
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F. Gross and Systematic Violations
The ECHR has been fortunate in having few cases of gross and
systematic violations.  Those cases that have been brought indicate
the limitations of the judicial process in resolving systemic failure of
the rule of law.233  In this respect, the ECHR faces the same problem
the United States Supreme Court did when it decided Brown v.
Board of Education234 in the face of long-standing and widespread de
jure discrimination, legally founded and often supported by the ma-
jority of citizens.  Without the full support of the executive, which re-
quired calling out the military to enforce the decision at one point,235
the United States Supreme Court’s judgment would have been
toothless.
The ECHR has faced some cases involving widespread and seri-
ous abuse.  The inter-state case brought by Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden against Greece,236 following a military coup d’etat and sus-
pension of the constitution in Greece in 1967, was the most difficult
situation faced by the system in its first decades.  A detailed investiga-
tion led the Commission to conclude that a purported Greek deroga-
tion from the Convention was invalid and that the Greek government
had committed flagrant violations of human rights.  On the eve of a
vote to expel Greece from the Council of Europe, the Greek govern-
ment announced its withdrawal, returning in 1974 after a restoration
of democracy.  Both in the short term and in the long run, the case
had the effect of strengthening the democratic opposition to the
Greek government, documenting the abuses that were occurring, and
legitimizing outside pressure on the military to return to democratic
governance.  Neither the existence of the Convention nor of the
ECHR prevented the coup d’etat or the large-scale human rights
violations that resulted, however.  Nor, for that matter, did the consti-
tution and laws of Greece stand in the way of the military.
233. For a suggestion that systemic failure also inheres in the European human rights
mechanisms, see Oren Gross, “Once More into the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying
the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 437
(1998).
234. Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas et al., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
235. Resistance to integration led to a showdown between white extremists and the federal
government in 1957 when President Eisenhower was forced to send federal troops to Little
Rock, Arkansas to disperse rioting white crowds preventing nine black students from entering
Central High School.  See 1957 Desegregation at Little Rock, Arkansas, at http://www.
eisenhowerbirthplace.org/legacy/ike0003.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
236. Denmark, Norway & Sweden v. Greece, 12 Y.B. Eur. Comm’n H.R. 1 (1969).
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In recent years, when there have been serious or widespread
violations, some states have challenged the authority of the European
Court of Human Rights’ judgments with regard to either the just sat-
isfaction awarded or specific measures required of them by the judg-
ments.237  The Committee of Ministers’ position remains firm that
states have an unconditional obligation to comply with judgments of
the Court.  Confidential scrutiny of a state during the Committee of
Ministers’ meetings can lead to direct contacts by the Chairman, pub-
lic resolutions may be adopted to convey the Committee of Ministers’
concerns, and other states, organizations, and parties can pressure the
recalcitrant government.  If there are serious obstacles to execution,
the Committee of Ministers may adopt a more strongly worded in-
terim resolution urging the authorities to take the necessary steps to
comply.  The Committee of Ministers has been urged by the Rome
Ministerial Conference and by the Parliamentary Assembly to study
what else may be done.  The problem is extremely serious because
non-compliance is a threat to the entire system.  As time passes and
compliance is not forthcoming, the credibility of the system is put in
question.
III.  JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP AND
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
Regional courts and other human rights bodies face questions
not only about their roles and jurisdiction vertically (vis a vis Member
States), but horizontally, in relation to the institutions that created
237. Italian procedural delay cases have been a fixture in recent years at the European
Court of Human Rights due to the failure of the Italian government to repair its judicial system.
In 2001 alone, the Court rendered 357 judgments concerning the length of court proceedings in
Italy.  See Eur. Ct. H.R., Survey of Activities 2001, at 22 (Council of Europe 2002).  The case of
Loizidou v. Turkey, supra note 139, has gone without enforcement due to Turkish dissatisfac-
tion with the decision.  The Council of Ministers has adopted increasingly strong resolutions
concerning the case, but without results thus far.  See Interim Resolution of the Comm. of Min-
isters, Res. DH(2001)80 (2001) (adopted by the Comm. of Ministers on June 26, 2001 at the
757th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) concerning the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights of July 28, 1998 in the case of Loizidou against Turkey.  In this resolution, the
Committee of Ministers recalled earlier resolutions, in which it declared “that the refusal of
Turkey to execute the judgment of the Court demonstrated a manifest disregard for Turkey’s
international obligations, both as a High Contracting Party to the Convention and as a member
State of the Council of Europe, and strongly insisted that, in view of the gravity of the matter,
Turkey comply fully and without any further delay with this judgment.”  The Committee of
Ministers declared its resolve “to ensure, with all means available to the organization, Turkey’s
compliance with its obligations under this judgment” and called upon the authorities of the
Member States to take such action as they deem appropriate to this end.
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them and inter se.  In this respect, two concerns have been raised
about the expanded human rights jurisdiction of the ECJ.  The first
stems from the Court’s already rising caseload, and will be discussed
infra.  The second problem is the risk of potential conflicts between
the jurisprudence of the ECHR and the ECJ.  Several such cases have
already arisen.  First, in the area of privacy rights, the two courts have
interpreted the scope of the right to privacy differently.  The ECJ has
interpreted it as not encompassing business activities or premises.238
Two years later, the ECHR held that a warrantless search of profes-
sional activities and premises constitutes a violation of the right to
privacy.239  A similar conflict has arisen in the interpretation of the
right against self-incrimination as found in ECHR Art. 6.  The ECJ
has held that the protection applies only to criminal investigations,
not to administrative procedures such as tax reviews.240  In a subse-
quent case, the ECHR reached a different result,241 holding that any
attempt to use pecuniary sanctions to force a person to produce self-
incriminating documents is a breach of Article 6.
The two courts have also approached the issue of homosexuality
differently, especially as concerns discriminatory measures.242  Nota-
bly, all these cases were decided by the ECJ before the issue had
arisen in the ECHR and thus were matters of first impression.  Where
there is clear jurisprudence of the ECHR, the ECJ has not diverged
in its judgments.  Nor have states been put to a choice between in-
compatible laws and inconsistent obligations.  Conforming to a wider
interpretation of the Convention, rights would not put the state in
breach of any obligation; indeed Article 53 acts as a savings clause to
ensure that any greater rights or broader interpretation of them will
be given effect.243  The problem of conflict is thus less real than it
might appear.
238. Case 142/88 Hoechs AG v. Bergrohr, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 383 (1991).
239. Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1993).
240. Case 374/87, Orkem SA v. Comm’n, 1984 E.C.R. 3283.
241. Funke v. France, 256-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
242. Compare Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 993 (1998)
with Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999) and Lustig-Prean &
Beckett v. United Kingdom, 7 Butterworths Human Rights Cases 65 (1999).  See also the differ-
ent approaches of the two courts on the provision of information about abortion services.  Case
C-159/90, SPUC v. Grogan compared to Open Door Counseling & Dublin Well Women Cen-
ters v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992).
243. Article 53 provides, “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or dero-
gating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under
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Individuals do try to use both systems to enhance human rights
protections.  The ECJ has faced the problem of determining the ex-
tent of its jurisdiction over human rights issues relating to enforce-
ment of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.  In 1997,
the Austrian Supreme Court asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling
to determine the effect of a decision by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights on a Member State.244  The ECJ held that it lacked juris-
diction to offer interpretive guidance because the matter was not fun-
damentally one of Community law.245  Had the ECJ decided
otherwise, its jurisdiction would have substantially overlapped with
that of the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe.
The applicant, Kremzow, was convicted in Austria of murder and
unlawful possession of a firearm for which he received the maximum
sentence of 20 years in an institution for the mentally ill.246  Kremzow
had initially confessed but promptly retracted his confession.  He ap-
pealed his conviction whereupon his sentence was modified to life in
an ordinary prison.  He claimed that his rights were violated because
he was not allowed to defend himself in person at the Austrian Su-
preme Court.  The ECHR unanimously found that Austria had vio-
lated Article 6(1) when taken in conjunction with Article 6(3) and
awarded Kremzow costs and expenses in just satisfaction.  Kremzow
then brought action in the civil court in Vienna asking for a reduction
in his sentence and for damages.  The court rejected his claim and the
decision was upheld on appeal.247  Although a judgment of the ECHR
has constitutional status in Austria, the effect on a final criminal
judgment is undecided in Austrian courts.  Kremzow filed an “ex-
traordinary appeal” with the Austrian Supreme Court, asking it to
the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.”
ECHR, supra note 1, art. 53.
244. Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Republic Osterreich, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1998).
245. Id. at 2646.
246. The facts are discussed at length in the case before the ECHR, Kremzow v. Austria, 17
Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (1993).
247. The damages claim was first rejected on February 9, 1994 by the Landesgericht für
Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Civil Court, Vienna).  That judgment was then upheld by the
Oberlandesgericht Wien (Higher Regional Court, Vienna) on July 25, 1994, on the ground that
under Paragraph 2(3) of the Amtshaftungsgesetz (the Law on State Liability) no claim for com-
pensation could arise out of a judgment of the Oberster Gerichtshof.  Further, under an April 3,
1995 order, the Oberster Gerichtshof rejected Mr. Kremzow’s application for a reduction in sen-
tence.  Id. paras. 9–10.
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request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the issue of whether the
decision of the ECHR is binding on Austrian Courts.
The Austrian Supreme Court requested that the ECJ answer
whether the provisions of the European Convention are part of
Community law allowing the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling pursu-
ant to Article 177 EC.248  In the event of a positive response to this
question, the Austrian Supreme Court had five further questions to
ask.
The ECJ first reaffirmed that “fundamental rights form an inte-
gral part of the general principles of Community law.” 249  Second, it
agreed that measures which are incompatible with observance of the
human rights recognized and guaranteed by the Community are not
acceptable.250  Third, the ECJ held that when an issue arises in the ap-
plication of Community law, the ECJ is obligated to assist the na-
tional court to act in conformity with Community law and the Euro-
pean Convention.251  When, however, the issue falls outside the scope
of Community law, the ECJ lacks jurisdiction to give a preliminary
ruling or interpretative guidance.252  In response to Kremzow’s argu-
ment that restraints on his freedom of movement raised an issue of
Community law, the ECJ found that the “hypothetical possibility of
restraint” had insufficient connection with Community law to justify
the application of Community provisions.253  In this respect, the ECJ
noted that Kremzow was convicted of violating domestic law, not
Community law.  The questions presented thus all concerned Aus-
trian national legislation, not Community law.  Accordingly, en-
forcement of the ECHR judgment remains within domestic law and
the institutions of the Council of Europe.
248. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty states: The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to
give preliminary rulings concerning (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and in-
terpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB; (c) the interpretation
of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member-state, that court or
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.  Where any such question is
raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a member state, against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter be-
fore the Court of Justice.
249. Kremzow, supra note 89, at 2645, ¶ 14.
250. Id. ¶ 14.
251. Id. ¶ 15.
252. Id.  See also SPUC, supra note 203.
253. Kremzow, supra note 89, at 2645, ¶ 16.
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IV.  CONCLUSION: IMPACT OF THE COURTS
AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
In Europe, it is relatively easy to demonstrate the effect of the
ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights judgments:254 Aus-
tria, for example, has modified its Code of Criminal Procedure;255 Bel-
gium has amended its Penal Code, its laws on vagrancy, and its Civil
Code;256 Germany has modified its Code of Criminal Procedure re-
garding pre-trial detention, given legal recognition to transsexuals,
and taken action to expedite criminal and civil proceedings;257 The
Netherlands has modified its Code of Military Justice and the law on
detention of mental patients;258 Ireland created a system of legal aid;259
Sweden introduced rules on expropriation and legislation on building
permits;260 Switzerland amended its Military Penal Code and com-
pletely reviewed its judicial organization and criminal procedure ap-
plicable to the army;261 and France has strengthened the protection for
privacy of telephone communications.262  The Court has undoubtedly
shaped the legal standards of Europe, influencing domestic law and
practice in criminal law, the administration of justice and family, im-
migration, media and property law.
There is one major difference, however, between the results ob-
tained in the European Court and those of a domestic court.  Most of
the changes made to state law and practice following a judgment of
the European Court are prospective and the individual applicant may
not benefit from them.  The European Court of Human Rights has no
power to reopen domestic proceedings, annul a wrongful conviction,
or ensure that the reforms instituted benefit the individual that
254. See generally Holly Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribu-
nals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 311 (1996).
255. See Neumeister, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968); Stogmuller, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1969); Matznetter, 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1969); Ringeisen, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1971);
and Bonisch, 92 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
256. De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp (Vagrancy Cases), 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1970) and
Marckx, supra note 143 (discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children).
257. See, e.g., Luedicke, supra note 211 (interpreters fees); Belkacem & Koc, supra note 135
(interpreters fees).
258. Engel, supra note 175 (military penal code) and Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1979) (mentally ill).
259. Airey, supra note 153, at 32.
260. Sporrong &Lonnroth, 88 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
261. Eggs v. Switzerland, Comm. of Ministers, Application 7341/76, reported at 15 Dec. &
Rep. 35 and 20 YB 448 (1980).
262. Guzzardi v. Italy, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980).
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brought the case in the first place.  It took Belgium nearly eight years
to change its legislation on the status of illegitimate children after the
judgment in the Marckx case, while Germany needed more than five
years to comply with the judgment in the Ozturk case that free lan-
guage interpretation must be provided for an accused.
The accomplishments of the Convention machinery must be un-
derstood in the context of the evolution and the pitfalls along the
way.  It is worth recalling that the first case considered by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights plunged it into one of the most politi-
cally sensitive and protracted conflicts in Europe. 263  It concerned the
detention without trial in Ireland of a suspected member of the Irish
Republican Army in the exercise of special powers conferred by the
Offences Against the State Act of 1940.  The Court found no viola-
tion in light of the Irish government’s derogation, which the Court
found was justified.  The 1978 interstate case of Ireland v. United
Kingdom264 also arose out of the conflict in Northern Ireland and al-
leged ill treatment of detainees by the British government.  In this in-
stance, the Court found violations of the Convention.  The fact that
the Court has survived and flourished despite taking up politically
sensitive cases, has adjudged more than 2,500 cases over more than 40
years, and has afforded remedies to individuals when none were
available in domestic law, is a remarkable achievement.  The question
is whether the Court is to be destroyed by its own success.
Today, more than 800 million persons in 44 states have direct ac-
cess to the European Court of Human Rights to complain of human
rights violations.  With the recent accession of Member States from
Central and Eastern Europe, the aims of the system have shifted in
part to take on consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in the
wider Europe.  The process is one of continuing and dynamic interac-
tion between the international mechanism and the national legal sys-
tems, in which the European Court of Human Rights, through its case
law and contacts with national courts, helps ensure that Convention
standards are implemented.
The major challenge today is to ensure that European human
rights law remains a single body of law based upon common values.
The ECHR is confronted with an expanding number of Member
States and problems, all of which have led to a crisis in caseload.  The
263. Lawless v. Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) Nos. 1 (Nov. 14, 1960), 2 (April 7, 1961) and 3
(July 1, 1961).
264. Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 180.
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magnitude of the problem facing the Court can be seen in its recent
statistics.265  In 2001, the Court issued more than one-third of the total
number of judgments delivered since it was created.266  It now receives
close to 800 letters every day.  From 1988 to 1999, the number of pro-
visional applications grew from 4,044 to 20,538.  Then in one year, the
number jumped to 26,398.  In 2001, the number again jumped to
31,393.  The number of cases registered after preliminary examination
shows a similar increase.  During 2001, 13,858 cases were registered,
some 2,200 more than were registered during the entire first 30 years
of the Convention.  Not only do the statistics reveal a huge surge in
complaints, but they show the origin of the complaints in every Mem-
ber State.  This means the Court must work in 40 national languages
in order to ensure that the right of petition is real and not illusory.  In
practice, the judges often have to examine applications drafted in an
unfamiliar language.
The system is seriously overloaded and with relatively limited re-
sources.  As of February 1, 2001, the Registry had 185 permanent of-
ficials, 95 temporary employees, and 15 trainees.  All legal systems
and languages must be represented among them.  The Committee of
Ministers is also increasingly burdened, which threatens effective
monitoring of compliance with the Court’s judgments.  Between
January and September 2002, the Committee of Ministers examined
715 new judgments—they were 493 during the same period in 2001—
and adopted 173 Final Resolutions compared to 84 during the same
period in 2001.  As of September 2002, close to 3250 cases were
pending before the Committee of Ministers for supervision of execu-
tion.
Given these growing problems, the reforms of Protocol No. 11
are themselves under study in a search for a “reform of the reform.”267
An examination undertaken towards the end of 2001 at the request of
the Committee of Ministers concluded that “immediate action is in-
dispensable if the Court is to remain effective and retain its credibility
265. Survey of Activities, supra note 237.
266. The Court delivered 888 judgments in 2001, out of the total number of 2,597 judgments
delivered by the Court since 1959.  Id. at 29.
267. Report of the Evaluation Group to the Comm. of Ministers on Eur. Ct. H.R., Eur. Con-
sult Ass., 109th Sess., Doc. No. EG Court (2001)1, available at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Steering_Committees/CDCJ/Documents/Documents%202001%20E.asp (last visited
Jan. 16, 2003).
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and authority.”268  Assuming that the substantive rights guaranteed
should not be reduced nor the right of individual petition eliminated,
the Evaluation Group sought means to enable the Court to dispose of
applications within a reasonable time while maintaining the quality of
its judgments.  The recommendations focus on five areas: national
measures, execution of judgments, measures not involving amend-
ment of the Convention, resources, and measures involving amend-
ment of the Convention.
In respect to national measures, the subsidiary nature of Conven-
tion machinery is recalled as states are encouraged to provide effec-
tive domestic remedies and systematically screen proposed legislation
and administrative regulations.  In addition, national courts must be
strengthened and procedures must be introduced to re-open domestic
proceedings after a finding by the Court of a Convention violation.
Training in human rights should be reinforced, especially for those re-
sponsible for law enforcement, and the Convention and its case law
should also be included in the curricula of university law faculties and
professional institutions.  The execution of judgments is necessary
and a priority matter if the Court is to be effective.  The Evaluation
Group noted the large number of repetitious cases, most of which
would not be necessary if state law or practice changed promptly to
comply with the Court’s judgments.  The Evaluation Group consid-
ered the idea of imposing financial penalties for non-execution of a
judgment, but saw problems in calculating such penalties, given the
lengthy legislative process that may be required to give effect to
changes required by a judgment.  The Group also suggested that the
Court’s recent practice of identifying the measures a state should take
to constitute restitutio in integrum (full restitution) could be further
developed and “would be beneficial in the context of the execution of
judgments.”269  The main new element indicated is an increased role
for the Parliamentary Assembly in monitoring execution of judg-
ments.  The political pressure coming from legislators could be an im-
portant element in maintaining the effectiveness of the system.
Several proposals for reform concern internal case management
procedures, enhancing the role of registry lawyers, and creating sum-
mary procedures to sift through cases earlier in the process.  Greater
268. Id. at 9.
269. Id. at 39.  The Court first called for restitution in Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, 330-B
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), art. 50.  See also Brumarescu v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng /Judgments.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
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recourse to friendly settlement is encouraged; the Court has already
begun to impose settlements in a few cases by threatening to dismiss
actions if applicants do not accept a fair settlement offer.  Other pro-
posals are controversial among judges and lawyers.  Some of the
judges see the Court’s role as best limited to taking up “important”
cases of gross or systematic violations; others feel it is important to
maintain the availability of the process for all victims of rights viola-
tions.  There is a similar division over the utility of fact-finding, with
some judges considering that memories and evidence are too unreli-
able after the five to seven years it may take a case to get to the
Court, while others feel that the ability of the Court to undertake
fact-finding serves as an important check on efforts to conceal or dis-
tort the record in human rights cases.  Judges and registry lawyers
also disagree among themselves about the value of oral argument.
Unfortunately, these controversies are likely to be resolved for time-
management considerations rather than for other, perhaps more sub-
stantive reasons.  The press of the caseload is likely to dictate the fu-
ture of ECHR practice.
While additional resources are certainly needed to ensure the
ECHR’s functioning, it is impossible to foresee infinite growth to
match the growing caseload.  The Convention itself sets the maximum
number of judges and the Court should not create a hidden judiciary
by shifting more work from the judges to the registry staff.  Even with
an increase in lawyers and streamlined procedures, it is estimated that
the caseload will surpass the capacity of the Court by 2005.  Several
alternatives are under consideration.  A possible response, already
mentioned, would give the Court discretionary jurisdiction, allowing
it to pick its cases for substantial issues.  This is the least desirable op-
tion as it takes away access to the Court at a time when it is most
needed and it risks exacerbating the growing feeling that the Court
affords selective justice.  A second option would be to create a re-
mand process, allowing cases to be sent back to local authorities or
tribunals for action.  A third option would be to create a separate di-
vision within the court to handle all preliminary matters, leaving the
bulk of the Court available to deal with issues of the merits.  These
latter two proposals are less radical and could remedy the problem
without destroying the right of access to justice.
Like the ECHR, the ECJ is also increasingly constrained by a
heavy case docket.  The Treaty of Amsterdam adds to this by giving
additional jurisdiction over issues concerning visas, asylum, and im-
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migration.  More appeals are also coming from the Court of First In-
stance.  The average length of proceedings is now close to two years.
Like the European Court of Human Rights, the ECJ may adopt vari-
ous reforms to alleviate the burden.
These problems can be seen as a reflection of the success of the
regional courts, whose functions differ somewhat.  The European
Court of Human Rights acts as a safety net to ensure that minimum
European standards adopted in the Convention are given effect by
the Contracting Parties.  It has largely succeeded.  According to
Buergenthal,
the decisions of the European Court are routinely complied with by
European governments.  As a matter of fact, the system has been so
effective in the last decade that the Court has for all practical pur-
poses become Western Europe’s constitutional court.  Its case law
and practice resembles that of the United States Supreme Court.270
The ECJ has emphasized the supremacy of EC Community law—not
only the treaties, but the regulations and directives as well—over the
law of the Member States.  In so doing, it has implied and applied no-
tions of fundamental rights, increasing its jurisdiction over the issue.
The supremacy of EC law and EC emphasis on harmonizing
Member State laws and adopting common standards to achieve mar-
ket integration and European citizenship produces the perhaps ini-
tially surprising result that Member States may have less discretion
over human rights matters within EC jurisdiction than they do in the
ECHR system with its overt human rights mandate.  The EC is ex-
pressly integrationist and its demands for elimination of market dis-
tortions allow less scope for diversity of national laws and policies
than does the ECHR with its doctrine of margin of appreciation and
respect for national differences.  Of course, application of the EC
doctrine of subsidiarity will mean that many human rights matters will
not fall within EC jurisdiction and national discretion will remain.  In
general, however, the future may see a two-tiered European human
rights system, where stricter regional governance on issues such as
employment discrimination between men and women will obtain
among EU Member States, coupled with a broader, but at the same
time looser, regional review possible through the ECHR.  With mem-
bership in the Council of Europe and the EU growing, the boundaries
of human rights jurisdiction in Europe thus continue to expand both
270. T. BUERGENTHAL & D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS
36 (3d ed. 1996).
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geographically and legally.  Horizontal and vertical tensions in gov-
ernance can be expected to continue and provide further fruit for dis-
cussion on the means and methods to best guarantee respect for hu-
man rights in Europe.
